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PROTECTING STATES IN THE NEW WORLD OF 
ENERGY FEDERALISM 
Daniel A. Lyons∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In a trilogy of recent cases, the Supreme Court has launched a quiet 
revolution in energy federalism. With little fanfare, it has abandoned its 
decades-long effort to divide electricity regulation into mutually exclusive 
spheres of federal and state authority. Instead it has embraced a more 
sophisticated concurrent jurisdiction model—against the wishes of Justice 
Scalia, who opposed this transformation in his final published dissent. 
This Article explores the ramifications of this revolution, particularly for 
state energy regulators. The shift to concurrent jurisdiction is long overdue. 
The historic model of the local vertically integrated utility has long been 
replaced by regional, complex, innovative electricity markets. Concurrent 
jurisdiction allows regulators to adapt more nimbly to changing market 
dynamics, unrestrained by the outdated formalism of the old dual federalism 
model. 
But this shift raises important questions regarding how states can remain 
relevant in an increasingly complex regulatory environment without the 
judicial safeguards that the dual federalism model once provided. States 
remain vital sources of local knowledge, experimentation, and expertise. But in 
this brave new world of concurrent jurisdiction, federalism-related disputes 
are more likely to be settled in the political arena than in the courtroom—an 
arena where federal authorities have the advantage. Drawing upon recent 
scholarship in negotiation theory and dynamic federalism, this Article 
discusses ways that state officials can, and do, negotiate with their federal 
counterparts to maintain influence over energy policy decisions. It also 
highlights procedural reforms that would improve the robustness and 
effectiveness of negotiations between state and federal officials in the 
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policymaking sphere and therefore improve the likelihood that policy decisions 
will be sensitive to federalism concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last two terms, the Supreme Court has quietly signaled a significant 
shift in the law of energy federalism. The Court has traditionally employed a 
dual federalism paradigm to settle jurisdictional disputes. Under this model, 
New Deal-era statutes such as the Federal Power Act1 and the Natural Gas Act2 
divided the energy industry neatly into two mutually exclusive spheres: federal 
agencies regulated interstate or wholesale operations, while intrastate or retail 
operations, which historically comprised the bulk of industry activity, 
remained the exclusive prerogative of state regulators.3 In the event of a 
jurisdictional dispute, the Court would typically engage in a formalistic inquiry 
to determine whether a particular initiative is better placed on the federal or 
state side of that jurisdictional “bright line.”4 
But the Court has struggled at times to police this line,5 and as Professor 
Jim Rossi has argued,6 a recent trilogy of cases has signaled a shift toward 
concurrent jurisdiction over some facets of energy markets. In early 2016, the 
Court allowed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to regulate 
transactions in which energy providers pay consumers to reduce electricity 
consumption during peak demand—over the dissent of Justice Scalia, who 
argued (in what turned out to be his final opinion) that the agency had crossed 
into the state’s regulatory sphere.7 Shortly thereafter, the Court invalidated 
 
 1 Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74-333, ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). The 1935 Federal Power Act amended an earlier 1920 Act that granted the 
Federal Power Commission licensing authority over hydroelectric dams, which fell outside state purview by 
virtue of affecting the navigable waters of the United States. See id. at 838; Federal Water Power Act, Pub. L. 
No. 66-280, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920). 
 2 See Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 75-688, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 717 (2012)).  
 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
 4 See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947) (discussing 
the “clear and complete” line between federal and state jurisdiction); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio v. United 
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 469 (1943) (conducting this inquiry). 
 5 See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2002) (explaining that regionalization of electricity 
markets challenges the market assumptions informing the Federal Power Act’s division of regulatory 
authority). 
 6 Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 430–37 (2016). 
 7 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016); see also id. at 784, 786 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the rule at issue regulated “retail electricity sales,” therefore being a matter of 
state, rather than FERC, authority). A few weeks later, the Court issued an extraordinary stay of the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan, pending a lower-court challenge by over two dozen 
affected states. Chamber of Commerce v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 136 S. Ct. 999 (2016). Commentators have 
suggested this was the first instance in recent memory of the Court staying a federal regulation pending the 
outcome of a lower-court decision, which is a testament to the Court’s unusual interest in these cases. See, e.g., 
William W. Buzbee, Federalism-Facilitated Regulatory Innovation and Regression in a Time of 
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Maryland’s attempt to guarantee new power plants a fixed price in federally 
administered wholesale markets, but carefully explained that states may 
regulate within their sphere even when their efforts incidentally affect areas 
within FERC’s domain.8 These electricity cases followed a similar decision 
during the preceding term that permitted the overlap of state and FERC 
authority in the related field of natural gas regulation, which prompted the late 
Justice Scalia to accuse the Court of “smudg[ing]” the line between federal and 
state authority over energy markets.9 
The Court’s seeming willingness to embrace a more sophisticated model of 
energy federalism follows a decades-long effort by Congress and FERC to 
restructure electricity markets. Traditionally, consumers purchased electricity 
from vertically integrated electric utilities that were regulated primarily at the 
state level, subject to rate regulation and nondiscrimination duties in exchange 
for protection from “destructive” competition.10 But beginning in the 1970s, 
Congress began to stimulate competition among electricity providers, 
prompting a lengthy realignment period wherein local vertically integrated 
utilities were dissected, restructured, and subjected to new forms of 
competition. This competitive dynamism, in turn, promoted greater economies 
of scale, leading traditionally fragmented markets to become regional in scope 
and more complex than they were in the monopoly era.11 This realignment was 
part of a broader movement that Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill dubbed 
the “Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law,”12 through which 
several traditionally rate-regulated infrastructure industries were subjected to 
experiments in managed competition and increased consumer choice.13  
 
Environmental Legislative Gridlock, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 451, 455 n.10 (2016) (“On February 9, 2016, the 
Supreme Court issued an unprecedented stay of the CPP, prior to creation of a regulatory record for review or 
a lower court ruling and with no opinion explaining its issuance of a stay.”). 
 8 See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292, 1297–98 (2016). 
 9 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015); id. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing the majority opinion “smudge[d]” the line between state and federal authority). 
 10 See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1353–54 (1998) (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, 
REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 347 (3d ed. 1994)); see also Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the 
Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving State and Local Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1619, 1626 (2014) (discussing regulatory tradeoffs in the electricity industry). 
 11 See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2002) (“[U]nlike the local power networks of the 
past, electricity is now delivered over three major networks, or ‘grids,’ in the continental United 
States. . . . [T]he nature and magnitude of coordination transactions have enabled utilities to operate more 
efficiently by transferring substantial amounts of electricity not only from plant to plant in one area, but also 
from region to region, as market conditions fluctuate.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 12 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1323. 
 13 Id. at 1325–26. 
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In electricity, as elsewhere, this “great transformation”14 in regulatory 
philosophy prompted an equally seismic shift in regulatory-utility federalism.15 
To accomplish their goals of jumpstarting competition and eliminating pockets 
of market power that could impede consumer choice, federal authorities 
needed to reach into intrastate markets that had traditionally been within the 
states’ portfolio.16 This practice spawned conflicts with state regulators eager 
to protect their jurisdiction and thwart federal initiatives that they viewed as 
inconsistent with state regulatory objectives.17 These disputes increased as the 
growing regionalization and complexity of electricity markets multiplied the 
planes of potential conflict between federal and state officials.  
By embracing concurrent jurisdiction, the Supreme Court appears to have 
found a new equilibrium between federal and state regulatory claims, one that 
relies on functionalist analysis of particular regulatory programs instead of 
formalistic emphasis on historic statutory silos. Rather than strictly enforcing 
mutually exclusive zones of authority as in years past, the Court seems 
comfortable allowing federal and state regulators to act even if initiatives at 
one level of government intrude somewhat into the other’s sphere. This is a 
positive development overall, as it aligns federalism doctrine more closely to 
the realities of the modern electricity market.18 The effect—indeed, the goal—
of the great transformation was to make static, unchanging electricity markets 
more nimble, disruptive, and competitive. Today’s increasingly fluid and 
innovative energy providers require a more fluid and innovative regulatory 
regime that can adapt more quickly to changing market conditions. The 
common-law-like functionalist approach of concurrent jurisdiction is more 
likely than dual federalism’s formalism to deliver the regulatory flexibility 
necessary to govern this dynamic new reality.19 
But the erosion of judicial safeguards to protect state jurisdiction raises 
important questions about the future enforcement of federalism norms in the 
energy law field. Although energy markets are no longer primarily intrastate, 
neither are they fully national in scope; rather, most energy markets are 
regional and benefit from the input of state regulators who have a better 
 
 14 See id. at 1324. 
 15 See, e.g., New York, 535 U.S. at 8–9. 
 16 See Ari Peskoe, A Challenge for Federalism: Achieving National Goals in the Electricity Industry, 18 
MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 209, 225–26 (2011). 
 17 See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). 
 18 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 6, at 405 (arguing that allowing concurrent jurisdiction in the context of 
modern energy markets “better advances the primary objective of [the energy] statutes”).  
 19 Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1181 (1989) 
(highlighting that standards give a decision maker more flexibility than rules do). 
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understanding of how broad federal policies should be tailored to fit local 
needs.20 Moreover, several federal initiatives—including the demand-response 
program at issue in the FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n21 decision—
began in state laboratories of experimentation.22 For these and other reasons, 
states should maintain an active presence in this policy space, although that 
challenge has been made marginally more difficult by the demise of dual 
federalism. 
This Article examines the levers that states can, and do, deploy to maintain 
relevance in an increasingly complex regulatory environment. Part I traces the 
origins of the dual federalism regime that historically governed electricity 
regulation, and the pressures that have begun putting cracks in this model in 
the modern era. Part II focuses on a trilogy of recent Supreme Court cases that 
acknowledge the shift toward a more cooperative federalism regime. It argues 
that in this “brave new world” of concurrent jurisdiction,23 federalism-related 
disputes are more likely to be settled in the political arena than in the 
courtroom.24 Finally, Part III examines how states can protect their interests 
given the decline of judicially enforceable jurisdictional boundaries. Drawing 
upon recent scholarship in negotiation theory25 and dynamic federalism,26 this 
Article discusses the tools available for state officials to negotiate with their 
federal counterparts to make their voices heard. It closes by suggesting 
procedural reforms that would improve the robustness and effectiveness of 
negotiations between state and federal officials in the policymaking sphere and 
therefore improve the likelihood that policy decisions will be sensitive to 
federalism concerns. 
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF DUAL FEDERALISM IN ENERGY LAW 
This Part discusses the origin of the dual federalism model and the modern 
factors that have placed it under increasing stress. As discussed below, the 
 
 20 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the transformation in energy markets). 
 21 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
 22 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 23 Rossi, supra note 6, at 403. 
 24 See, e.g., id. at 407 (“[C]oncurrent jurisdiction emboldens political institutions, rather than courts, to 
consider and make decisions about the federalism balance in regulation of interstate energy transactions.”).  
 25 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (framing federalism as a 
process of negotiation between the federal government and the states and proposing a theoretical framework 
for organizing this bargaining). 
 26 See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773 
(2013) (proposing dynamic federalism principles to navigate the complex interactions between federal and 
state authority over energy regulation). 
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Federal Power Act, which gives FERC jurisdiction over energy markets, was 
enacted during the New Deal against a backdrop of extensive state regulation 
of the electricity sector and was created primarily to regulate conduct that 
states could not reach because of the Commerce Clause.27 For the first forty 
years, the law recognized a strict dual federalism regime, wherein energy law 
was sharply divided into two mutually exclusive hemispheres, with both state 
and federal regulators exercising plenary authority within their respective 
zones of control.28 But following the 1970s energy crisis, Congress and then 
FERC upset this balance by reaching into the state sphere to encourage greater 
competition within electricity markets.29 Ultimately, these reforms drove a 
comprehensive restructuring of electricity markets, in the process prompting a 
series of federalism-related conflicts with affected states. 
A. Dual Federalism by Design: The Structure of New Deal Statutes 
From its inception, energy law has been shaped by the concept of dual 
federalism. Courts interpreted the relevant statutes to create sharp and mutually 
exclusive divisions of authority between the federal government and the states. 
As explained by the Court when discussing the Natural Gas Act, it was “clear” 
that the statute contemplates “a harmonious, dual system of 
regulation . . . [with] federal and state regulatory bodies operating side by side, 
each active in its own sphere . . . without any confusion of functions.”30  
This division of authority was not accidental, but rather was an intentional 
feature designed during the New Deal, in part to protect preexisting state 
regulators from federal intrusion.31 In 1907, Wisconsin and New York enacted 
the first state public utility laws, which subjected electricity utilities and other 
businesses affected by the public interest to comprehensive regulation by state 
authorities.32 At the time, economists and policymakers considered electricity 
and other infrastructure markets to be “natural monopolies,” which were most 
efficiently served by a single firm and within which competition was likely to 
be destructive rather than beneficial.33 Consistent with this theory, Wisconsin’s 
public utility law “represented a grand bargain between” state regulators and 
 
 27 See infra notes 31–43 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 56–102 and accompanying text. 
 30 Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 467 (1943). 
 31 Ernest Young discusses the intellectual roots of the dual federalism model, in which “the sovereignty 
principle coexisted with a strong principle of autonomy reserving significant regulatory authority to the states.” 
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (2004). 
 32 See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1626; Peskoe, supra note 16, at 212–13. 
 33 Lyons, supra note 10, at 1626. 
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the utilities they regulated: the state would grant each utility a monopoly over 
service within a given geographic area, which would protect the firm from 
competition and entice the utility to invest the huge fixed costs required to start 
a utility.34 In exchange, the utility agreed to rate regulation, minimum service 
requirements, and nondiscrimination obligations enforced by state regulators to 
make sure the firm did not abuse its monopoly position.35 By 1920, nearly 
every state had a similar law governing the electricity industry.36 
As the Supreme Court has explained many times,37 the need for federal 
electricity legislation developed almost by accident, the byproduct of a 
regulatory gap in the state system first identified by the Court in Public 
Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.38 In 
that case, a Rhode Island utility agreed to sell a small amount of surplus 
electricity production to a neighboring Massachusetts utility for delivery to 
Massachusetts consumers.39 The selling utility later successfully sought a rate 
increase for sale of this surplus electricity from the Rhode Island Public Utility 
Commission, but when the Massachusetts utility challenged the state 
commission’s order, the Supreme Court found that the rate increase constituted 
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.40 In doing so, the Court 
exposed a regulatory void wherein monopoly utilities could sell electricity 
across state lines without governmental review to assure the transaction 
satisfied the public interest. 
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act41 to close this 
“Attleboro gap.” The Act was careful to assure that the new federal regulator 
would not intrude upon the regulatory efforts already underway at the state 
level. The Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce that accompanied the bill clarified that the Federal Power 
Commission (FERC’s predecessor) would be “a complement to and in no 
sense a usurpation of [s]tate regulatory authority.”42 Similarly, FPC 
 
 34 See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1626–27. 
 35 Id. at 1626. 
 36 See id. at 1626–27; Peskoe, supra note 16, at 213. 
 37 See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2002) (discussing the Attleboro gap); Ark. Elec. 
Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 378–80 (1983) (same). 
 38 273 U.S. 83, 90 (1927). 
 39 Id. at 84. 
 40 Id. at 90. 
 41 Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74-333, ch. 687, tit. II, 49 Stat. 803, 838, 847 (1935) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 42 H.R. REP. NO. 74-1318, at 7, 8, 27 (1935); see also Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Fed. Power 
Comm’n, 324 U.S. 515, 526 (1945) (discussing the Federal Power Act’s legislative history). 
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Commissioner Clyde Seavey testified before Congress in support of the bill, 
noting that it was “conceived entirely as a supplement to, and not a substitute 
for State regulation.”43  
To that end, the Federal Power Act defines the Commission’s jurisdiction 
in both positive and negative terms. Section 201 grants FERC two related 
regulatory powers: the agency has power to regulate (1) “the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce” and (2) “the sale of electric energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce.”44 But the same passage then clarifies that 
the Commission “shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the 
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only 
for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce or over facilities 
for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”45 
To resolve any confusion, the preface to this section explains that Congress 
intended “such Federal regulation, however, to extend only to those matters 
which are not subject to regulation by the [s]tates.”46 While the Supreme Court 
has interpreted this last phrase as a statement of policy rather than an 
independent restriction on the Commission’s authority, it nonetheless 
explained that the policy statement “is relevant and entitled to respect as a 
guide in resolving any ambiguity or indefiniteness” in the statute.47 
For the next several decades, the notion that federal and state regulators 
each presided over distinct and mutually exclusive spheres of authority shaped 
energy law. One could argue that this statutory dual federalism was a logical 
 
 43 Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearing on H.R. 5423 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & 
Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. 384 (1935) (statement of Clyde Seavey, Comm’r, Federal Power 
Commission); see Conn. Light & Power, 324 U.S. at 525. 
 44 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
 45 Id. This state savings clause, defining federal jurisdiction in negative terms, is not unique to the 
Federal Power Act. Like many other New Deal-era statutes, the Federal Power Act was modeled upon the first 
federal public utility law, the Progressive-era Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (ICA), which governed 
interstate railroads. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887). In the Shreveport Rate Case, 
the Supreme Court interpreted the ICA to grant federal regulators authority to regulate certain intrastate 
railroad practices on the theory that such intrastate practices had an effect on federally regulated interstate 
rates. Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 351–52 (1914). 
When Congress enacted the Communications Act of 1934 to provide for federal regulation of the burgeoning 
Bell Telephone empire, it explicitly added a savings clause prohibiting the new Federal Communications 
Commission from assuming jurisdiction over intrastate communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2012). This 
provision was included to clarify that the logic of the Shreveport Rate Case would not extend to telephone 
regulation. See Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should Decide the Future of 
Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 383, 389 (2010). One may fairly assume that a 
similar savings clause in the Federal Power Act was included to give state regulators similar security that their 
spheres of authority were not at risk by the new federal regulator. 
 46 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
 47 Conn. Light & Power, 324 U.S. at 527. 
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outgrowth of pre-New Deal conceptions of the limits of the federal 
government’s Commerce Clause power to regulate intrastate activity.48 But 
long after cases like Wickard v. Filburn49 smudged the constitutional 
boundaries and admitted the possibility of overlapping power to regulate, 
courts continued to patrol these statutory bright lines in energy law cases to 
assure that one branch of government did not intrude into the realm of 
another.50 The language of these decisions was characteristically broad and 
straightforward, leaving no room for ambiguity or common-law-like 
functionalist analysis of the impact of a particular program. For example, the 
Court explained that the Natural Gas Act’s jurisdictional line, which parallels 
that of the Federal Power Act, was “clear and complete” and “cut sharply and 
cleanly” between federal and state authority in a way that preserved state 
regulatory authority that existed “before the Act was passed.”51 Similarly, the 
Court “squarely rejected” any suggestion that jurisdictional disputes under the 
Federal Power Act could be “determined by a case-by-case analysis of the 
impact of state regulation upon the national interest. Rather, Congress meant to 
draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction, 
making unnecessary such case-by-case analysis.”52 
B. The Statutory Shift Toward Cooperative Federalism 
1. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
For the next forty years, dual federalism coexisted relatively peacefully 
with the traditional rate-regulated structure of the electricity industry. Until 
1978, the vast majority of electricity utilities were vertically integrated 
intrastate firms, each of which generated its own electricity, transmitted it 
along high-voltage transmission lines, and distributed it to retail customers 
within the utility’s service territory.53 The Public Utility Holding Company Act 
 
 48 See, e.g., Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be Revived?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 
1518 (2002) (noting that the Taft Court subscribed to a theory of “[d]ual sovereignty [which] held that the 
nation and the states were each authorized to control autonomous and distinct domains of social life”). 
 49 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 50 Which is not to say that the Court continued to apply pre-New Deal constitutional limits to the 
Federal Power Commission. My point is more modest, being that just as pre-Wickard case law divided the 
country into federal and state jurisdiction as a constitutional matter, so too did post-New Deal case law create a 
two-sphere regulatory world as a statutory matter. 
 51 Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947); see Rossi, supra note 
6, at 417.  
 52 Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
 53 See RICHARD J. PIERCE JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUTSHELL 364 (4th 
ed. 1999). 
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of 1935 provided strong incentives for utilities to limit their operations to a 
single state.54 As Professor Rossi has chronicled, the Federal Power 
Commission—and later FERC—aggressively protected its jurisdiction, leading 
to numerous court decisions highlighting the federal government’s “plenary” 
authority over interstate and wholesale markets and noting that the Federal 
Power Act has “occupied the field” in these areas.55 But these decisions only 
reinforced the notion of a sharp, bright, and relatively static line between 
regulation of interstate and intrastate operations. 
This static, rigid conception of the energy industry began to change with 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).56 Passed as a 
reaction to the 1970s energy crisis, PURPA was meant to promote energy 
conservation and to diversify America’s electric power industry so that the 
country would not be so reliant upon fossil fuels.57 In pursuit of these federal 
objectives, PURPA included two significant provisions that reached into the 
sphere of authority traditionally reserved to the states. First, it required state 
public utility commissions to “consider” whether to adopt several measures 
meant to promote energy conservation as part of their ratemaking efforts.58 The 
statute spelled out the procedures by which state ratemakers must “consider” 
these federal suggestions,59 and it required that states report their progress 
periodically to FERC.60 Second, and perhaps more notably, PURPA instructed 
FERC to make rules encouraging non-utility companies to generate their own 
electricity using alternative energy sources such as cogeneration.61 The Act 
required utilities to buy electric power from these small power production 
facilities rather than generating power themselves if it was cost-efficient to do 
so, and gave FERC the power to exempt these non-utility electricity generators 
from otherwise applicable state laws.62 
 
 54 Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (repealed 2005); see Lyons, supra 
note 10, at 1627; Peskoe, supra note16, at 218–19. 
 55 See Rossi, supra note 6, at 415–27. 
 56 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 57 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745–46 (1982). 
 58 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (2012); see also id. §§ 2621(d), 2623(b), 2624(a) (listing the various federal 
standards to be considered by state energy regulators).  
 59 15 U.S.C. § 3203 (2012); 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(b)–(c)(2), 2623. 
 60 15 U.S.C. § 3209(a); 16 U.S.C. § 2626(a). 
 61 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(a). “Cogeneration” refers to the process of making electricity and other energy 
simultaneously, such as by using the steam left over from electricity generation to produce heat. This process 
can be useful for small-scale buildings or complexes with significant heating or cooling needs, such as office 
buildings or hospitals. See id.; id. § 796(18)(A) (defining “cogeneration facility”). 
 62 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3. 
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As Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill have noted in their 
seminal article The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 
PURPA was part of a larger shift in America’s infrastructure industries away 
from traditional rate-regulated monopolies and toward the promotion of 
consumer choice.63 In the railroad, airline, trucking, telecommunications, 
electricity, and natural gas industries, policymakers began to emphasize 
competition rather than regulation as the primary guarantor of consumer 
protection.64 Commentators often described this change as “deregulation,” 
although, as Professors Kearney and Merrill explain, “if ‘deregulation’ means 
that a system of public regulation is abolished and replaced by exclusive 
reliance on market transactions, this is an inaccurate characterization of what 
[was] happening.”65 It is perhaps more accurate to describe the new paradigm 
as one of “managed competition,” wherein regulators radically rearranged 
existing markets to stimulate new competitors. The focus of regulators shifted 
from consumer protection of nondiscrimination norms to competitor 
protection, identifying and eliminating pockets of market power by incumbents 
and others that might inhibit market entry on a level playing field.66 
But like many other Great Transformation initiatives, this seismic shift in 
perspective in regulatory philosophy triggered an equally seismic shift in 
regulatory federalism. To achieve PURPA’s goals of reducing energy 
consumption and promoting competition among new sources of electricity, 
Congress had to reach into a sphere—vertically integrated electricity utilities—
that traditionally lay within the states’ authority. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
act prompted a backlash from state regulators unhappy with the federal 
government’s intrusion across the traditional regulatory divide. 
The Supreme Court addressed this backlash in FERC v. Mississippi,67 one 
of the first cases to raise doubts about the inviolability of the dual federalism 
model. In that case, state regulators challenged PURPA on constitutional 
grounds, alleging that the statute violated both the Commerce Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment as an intrusion into state sovereignty.68 In a 5–4 decision, 
 
 63 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1329–30. 
 64 See Orloff v. FCC, 352 F.3d 415, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that “[a] carrier’s success ‘should be 
driven by technological innovation, service quality, competition-based pricing decisions, and responsiveness to 
consumer needs—and not by strategies in the regulatory arena’” (quoting In re Implementation of Sections 
3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report and 
Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 1411, 1420 (1994)).  
 65 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1324–25. 
 66 Id. at 1361–64. 
 67 456 U.S. 742, 753 (1982). 
 68 Id. at 752. 
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the Court upheld the statute, explaining that under the Commerce Clause, 
Congress could have preempted the field of electricity regulation completely if 
it had chosen to do so.69 Given this fact, the Court explained, “PURPA should 
not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress 
adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the [s]tates to continue regulating 
in the area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal 
standards.”70 While “the choice put to the [s]tates—that of either abandoning 
regulation of the field altogether or considering the federal standards—may be 
a difficult one,”71 it does not “involve the compelled exercise of Mississippi’s 
sovereign powers” and therefore does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the 
state’s sovereignty.72 
The Court recognized that there might be an alternative to the dual 
federalism model that heretofore dominated energy policy. Although the case 
did not involve interpretation of the Federal Power Act’s jurisdictional 
provisions, it nonetheless acknowledged the possibility that not every question 
of energy law fell neatly into the exclusive province of either FERC or its state 
analogues.73 At least with regard to energy conservation measures and the 
promotion of alternative generation sources, the Court recognized that 
Congress had opened the door to “cooperative federalism”: a shared power 
arrangement wherein the federal government sets the basic policy goals of a 
regulatory scheme and enlists states to carry out the scheme, but states have 
some latitude to tailor policies in response to local conditions.74 
States responded to this invitation by pressing the jurisdictional envelope 
themselves, perhaps most notably with the Pike County doctrine. In Pike 
County Power & Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,75 the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) excluded from the utility’s rate 
base a portion of the wholesale power cost that the utility paid to its parent 
company because the utility could have bought power more cheaply from an 
 
 69 Id. at 765. 
 70 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 71 Id. at 766. 
 72 Id. at 769, 771. 
 73 Id. at 761–62, 764–65, 769–71 (noting that although Mississippi possessed the ability to regulate 
energy via state regulatory bodies, it is not the case that such state-level regulation is totally separate from 
federal regulation under FERC because federal law frames elements that state regulators must consider with 
respect to rules and regulations impacting the use, creation, and sale of energy). 
 74 See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 377, 384 & n.35 (2005); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the 
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1698 & n.23 (2001). 
 75 465 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1983). 
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alternative supplier.76 The utility argued that the PUC infringed on FERC’s 
jurisdiction by attempting to regulate the utility’s wholesale rates.77 The court 
disagreed, concluding that the state was not determining the wholesale rate that 
the parent company charged, but rather whether it was prudent for the utility to 
include that charge in its retail rate base.78 The court in Pike County allowed 
the PUC to pass judgment on its utilities’ wholesale-power purchasing 
decisions, thus giving both state and federal authorities influence over 
wholesale markets—a practice that was upheld in some states79 but rejected in 
others as inconsistent with the Federal Power Act.80 Both the Supreme Court 
and FERC acknowledged the existence of the Pike County doctrine without 
addressing whether it constituted a permissible interpretation of the Federal 
Power Act.81 
2. Energy Policy Act of 1992  
PURPA’s effort to jumpstart competition in the electricity generation 
market was the opening salvo in a lengthy battle to restructure the nation’s 
electricity markets. Professors Kearney and Merrill note that PURPA 
“inadvertently created a lobby for open access” to utility-owned transmission 
networks.82 PURPA-favored independent power producers sought to compete 
in FERC-regulated wholesale electricity markets, but were thwarted by the 
utilities’ continued monopoly over the transmission lines that carry electricity 
from generators to consumers.83 Vertically integrated utilities had little 
incentive to provide transmission facilities to independent generators who 
competed against the utility’s own electricity generation facilities.84 But FERC 
 
 76 Id. at 736. 
 77 Id. at 737. 
 78 Id. at 738. To this point, the court held that FERC and the PUC serve complementary but separate 
roles in determining rates for electric service describers and that such an arrangement properly reserves to the 
PUC the sole ability to determine the reasonableness of such rates. Id. 
 79 See, e.g., Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 491 N.E.2d 1035, 1043–45 (Mass. 1986); 
Spence v. Smyth, 686 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1984) (holding that the Wyoming Public Service Commission properly 
followed its own policies while complying with the relevant requirements of FERC). 
 80 See, e.g., Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358 (1977). 
 81 See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 972 (1986) (explaining that regardless 
of Pike County’s validity, the doctrine did not apply to the present case); In re AEP Generating Co., 39 FERC 
¶ 61,158, at 61,630 (1987) (recognizing the Pike County doctrine but noting that it “is inapplicable to the facts 
of this case”). 
 82 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1395; see also David B. Spence, Regulation, Climate Change, 
and the Electric Grid, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 267, 276 (2012). 
 83 Cf. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1395 (noting that since PURPA’s passage, “[i]ndependent 
power producers have . . . become an active force pushing for greater access to interstate power grids”). 
 84 See id. at 1353–54 (quoting PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 10, at 347) (noting the vertically 
integrated environment that energy utilities operated in prior to 1978). 
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had very limited authority to order a recalcitrant utility to provide transmission 
services against its will to a competitor for delivery to wholesale markets (an 
arrangement known as “wheeling”).85 Congress filled this gap with the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992,86 which lifted most preexisting restrictions on FERC’s 
wheeling authority and instead allowed FERC—if it found that doing so would 
serve the public interest—to order specific utilities to wheel power upon 
request by an electricity generator.87  
Nevertheless, in the spirit of promoting cooperative federalism, the Act 
provided two avenues through which state regulators could influence the grant 
of wheeling authority. First, the Act retained a preexisting requirement that, 
before issuing an order, FERC must give “notice to each affected State 
regulatory authority” and “afford[] an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing” 
on the question.88 This gave state regulators the opportunity up front to raise 
objections to particular wheeling requests. Second, it provided that FERC shall 
terminate a wheeling order if (1) the order required enlargement of existing 
transmission facilities and (2) the utility, after making a “good faith effort,” 
was unable to get siting approval from the relevant state or local authorities.89 
In other words, if the state saw no in-state benefit to a wheeling order that 
required facility expansion, the state could effectively block the order by 
failing to issue the necessary siting approvals, so long as its efforts were 
consistent with underlying state siting laws.90 
 
 85 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374–76, 375 n.7 (1973). The Court noted in 
Otter Tail—an antitrust case brought by the government against a recalcitrant utility—that the Federal Power 
Commission had “limited authority” to order interconnection and “no authority” to order wheeling. Id. at 374–
76. PURPA later gave FERC limited authority to order wheeling, but because of the conditions Congress 
placed on that authority, FERC never exercised it. 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2012). 
 86 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 87 See 16 U.S.C. § 824j; see also Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1354 (explaining that “wheeling” 
arrangements “ensure that customers have the benefits of competitively priced generation”). 
 88 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a). This provision was included in PURPA’s original, restricted grant of wheeling 
authority to FERC. See Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §203, 92 Stat. 
3117, 3137 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §824j). 
 89 16 U.S.C. § 824j. 
 90 Perceived problems with state siting authority as an inhibitor of federal market expansion has driven 
Congress to create yet another cooperative, federalism-themed encroachment on state regulatory authority. 
Numerous commentators have noted that transmission line construction has failed to keep pace with the 
expansion of the electricity industry, leading to greater strain on the country’s existing transmission networks. 
Alexandra B. Klass, Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079, 1084–85 (2013). This problem is 
compounded by the rise of renewable electricity, which is typically generated far from load centers and 
requires construction of new transmission lines to bring these new resources to the market. See Alexandra B. 
Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism 
Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811 (2012); Lyons, supra note 10, at 1637–38. In response, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 grants FERC limited backstop authority to grant siting approval of new transmission 
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C. Order 888 and the Administrative Push Toward Concurrent 
Jurisdiction 
In the years following PURPA’s enactment, FERC creatively and 
aggressively exercised its authority under the Federal Power Act to promote 
greater competition and to mitigate market power in interstate electricity 
markets. Even before Congress expanded its wheeling authority in 1992, 
FERC used its merger authority to promote greater wheeling by interstate 
transmission networks. Section 203 of the Federal Power Act requires FERC 
approval of mergers involving any utility subject to FERC jurisdiction.91 In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, FERC often conditioned its approvals on 
commitments by post-merger entities to offer transmission services to 
competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis.92 The agency justified these 
requirements as necessary to mitigate the potential market power that could 
result from the merger.93 Over time, the agency hoped to cajole the industry 
into voluntarily providing the wheeling services that it lacked the ability to 
impose directly.94  
By its own admission, FERC “aggressively” exercised the additional 
wheeling authority granted to it by the Energy Policy Act of 1992.95 Between 
1992 and 1996, FERC issued orders requiring that a utility provide wheeling 
services for a complaining wholesale competitor in twelve separate cases.96 
Ultimately FERC concluded that piecemeal wheeling was “too costly and 
time-consuming” and was not achieving the level of market reform that it 
sought.97 In response, it adopted its landmark Order 888 in 1996, which 
 
facilities even without state approval, provided the proposed line is in an area designated by the Department of 
Energy as a “national interest electric transmission corridor.” Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)–
(b). But use of this authority has thus far been stymied by litigation over procedures through which the 
Department of Energy has designated existing corridors, as well as the breadth of FERC’s rules to exercise the 
authority granted it by the statute. See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1079 
(9th Cir. 2011); Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009).  
 91 16 U.S.C. § 824b. 
 92 See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co., 45 FERC ¶ 61,095, at 61,268, 61,291, 61,309 (approving merger 
but imposing open-access transmission service obligations as conditions of approval); see also Rossi, supra 
note 6, at 428 (noting that the FERC’s rules aimed to “provide ‘equal access’ to transmission lines through the 
filing of open-access tariffs with the agency”). 
 93 Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglas W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992—A Watershed for 
Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 447, 458–59 (1993). 
 94 See id. 
 95 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,547 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts 35, 385). 
 96 Id. 
 97 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 9 (2002). 
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mandated industry-wide wheeling in all markets that FERC regulated.98 The 
order functionally unbundled wholesale electricity markets by requiring all 
wholesale providers to provide wholesale transmission services under a single 
tariff applicable to itself and others.99 It also imposed a similar requirement on 
retail transmission if the retailer sold transmission on an unbundled basis 
(meaning the utility voluntarily offered transmission to competitors as a 
standalone service) in interstate commerce.100 As authority for Order 888, 
FERC cited section 206 of the Federal Power Act, which gives it authority to 
remedy discriminatory practices in FERC-jurisdictional markets.101 It 
explained that “market power through control of transmission is the single 
greatest impediment to competition”; and, therefore, remedying discriminatory 
practices would create a more competitive wholesale electricity market.102 
In Order 888, FERC recognized the “very legitimate concerns of state 
regulatory authorities” that “jurisdictional boundaries may shift as a result of 
restructuring programs in wholesale and retail markets.”103 These concerns 
were largely due to the Order’s sweeping assertion of authority over both 
wholesale and interstate retail markets. As noted above, the Federal Power Act 
gave FERC jurisdiction over wholesale markets, but states traditionally 
regulated retail sales.104 The extension of Order 888 to cover unbundled retail 
transactions in interstate commerce could thus prove disruptive to existing 
state retail regulatory schemes. Under an earlier Supreme Court decision, 
Federal Power Commission v. Florida Power & Light Co.,105 a retail 
transmission could be jurisdictionally interstate even if the seller and buyer 
were in the same state, provided that the transmission line was connected to a 
larger interconnection grid; therefore, the electricity in question was 
“commingled” with electricity sold in interstate commerce.106 This 
interpretation meant that Order 888 reached virtually all retail sales outside of 
those in Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of Texas (where transmission lines were not 
 
 98 See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,541 (introducing the regulations). 
 99 Id. at 21,552; see New York, 535 U.S. at 11. 
 100 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services 
by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,571–72; see New York, 535 U.S. at 11. 
 101 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012). 
 102 See New York, 535 U.S. at 10 (quoting Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access 
Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,662, 17,664 (proposed Apr. 7, 
1995) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35)). 
 103 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services 
by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,542. 
 104 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 105 404 U.S. 453 (1972). 
 106 See id. at 463. 
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connected to larger interstate grids), unless the utility chose not to offer retail 
transmission on an unbundled basis.107 
Concerned about losing control over retail transmission lines, New York 
challenged Order 888’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail sales. 
The state argued that the Federal Power Act’s legislative history showed that 
by granting FERC authority over wholesale markets, Congress meant to leave 
retail electricity markets to the states.108 The Court disagreed, explaining that 
the Federal Power Act created two founts of regulatory authority: FERC could 
regulate both “the sale of electric energy at wholesale” and “the transmission 
of electricity in interstate” markets.109 Under this plain language, FERC had 
authority to apply Order 888 to unbundled retail transmissions in interstate 
commerce.110 The Court went on to reaffirm the holding in Florida Power & 
Light, that “transmissions on the interconnected national grids constitute 
transmissions in interstate commerce.”111 
New York v. FERC thus turned ultimately upon the same formalistic 
analysis reflected in earlier cases interpreting the Federal Power Act’s 
jurisdictional divide. The Court’s analysis focused primarily upon the language 
of the statute: “[W]e must interpret the statute to determine whether Congress 
has given FERC the power to act as it has, and we do so without any 
presumption one way or the other.”112 Because the statute placed interstate 
transmission on the federal side of the line, Order 888 was valid, despite New 
York’s argument that this construction was contradicted by legislative history 
and would “impede sound energy policy.”113 At first glance, therefore, the case 
fits comfortably within the long line of cases examining FERC’s jurisdiction 
through a dual federalism lens. 
But foreshadowing its later shift toward concurrent jurisdiction, the Court 
in New York noted repeatedly that “the landscape of the electric industry has 
changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the electricity universe was 
 
 107 Justice Douglas predicted this federal jurisdictional grab two decades before Order 888. In his dissent 
in Florida Power & Light, he explained that “fleeting episodes” of interstate transmission “are not in my view 
sufficient to displace a state regime with the federal one, since the Congress promised that as much as possible 
be left to the States. . . . If we allow federal pre-emption in this case, then we have come full cycle, leaving 
local authorities control of electric energy only insofar as municipal plants are concerned. The federal camel 
has a tendency to occupy permanently any state tent.” Id. at 476 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 108 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 20–24 (2002). 
 109 Id. at 16–17. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 16. 
 112 Id. at 18. 
 113 Id. at 24. 
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‘neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale sales.’”114 Indeed, this 
shift soothed any apprehension the Court had regarding potential conflicts 
between its holding and the legislative history of the Federal Power Act:  
Our evaluation of the extensive legislative history reviewed in 
New York’s brief is affected by the importance of the changes in the 
electricity industry that have occurred since the FPA was enacted in 
1935. No party to these cases has presented evidence that Congress 
foresaw the industry’s transition from one of local, self-sufficient 
monopolies to one of nationwide competition and electricity 
transmission. Nor is there evidence that the 1935 Congress foresaw 
the possibility of unbundling electricity transmissions from sales. 
More importantly, there is no evidence that if Congress had foreseen 
the developments to which FERC has responded, Congress would 
have objected to FERC’s interpretation of the FPA. Whatever 
persuasive effect legislative history may have in other contexts, here 
it is not particularly helpful because of the interim developments in 
the electric industry.115 
The Court is correct that modern electricity markets have moved far away 
from the local vertically integrated monopoly model that shaped the Federal 
Power Act. Even before FERC began experimenting with wheeling, local 
utilities had begun integrating their grids with one another to benefit from 
greater economies of scale, such as greater reliability and the ability to buy or 
sell excess electricity from neighboring utilities.116 Over time, these pooling 
arrangements have united the contiguous United States into three regional 
grids, known as “interconnections.”117 The Continental Divide roughly 
separates the Western Interconnection from the much larger Eastern 
Interconnection, while most of Texas is on a separate interconnection known 
as the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, or ERCOT.118  
This integration of local transmission networks has created a greater 
regionalization of electricity markets. It may be a bit of an overstatement to 
suggest, as the Court did in New York, that “a customer in Vermont [may] 
purchase electricity from an environmentally friendly power producer in 
California or a cogeneration facility in Oklahoma.”119 After all, there are only a 
 
 114 Id. at 16 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). 
 115 Id. at 23. 
 116 See STAN MARK KAPLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40511, ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION: 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ISSUES 2–3 (2009). 
 117 Id. at 3. 
 118 Id. 
 119 New York, 535 U.S. at 8 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp., 225 F.3d at 681). 
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handful of ties between the Western and Eastern Interconnections, and 
electricity dissipates as it travels long distances over transmission lines (a 
phenomenon known as “line loss”).120 But the sentiment is directionally 
correct. The bulk of the nation’s transmission grid is interstate, and a 
significant amount of electricity crosses state lines en route from generation to 
consumption. Far from merely plugging the Attleboro gap in a regulatory 
environment dominated by state regulators, today’s FERC has authority to 
regulate the vast majority of the nation’s electricity grid. 
In the two decades following Order 888, FERC has repeatedly exercised its 
authority under the Federal Power Act to continue restructuring the electricity 
industry, with significant spillover effects on state-regulated markets. Professor 
Sharon Jacobs has described this pattern as “bypassing federalism.”121 Her 
claim is that FERC uses the jurisdictional authority granted to it under the FPA 
to “achieve policy aims without challenging jurisdictional boundaries head 
on.”122 In other words, by maximizing its influence within its designated 
sphere, FERC can exert effects on markets beyond its control, effecting a “de 
facto, rather than de jure, reallocation of power” vis-à-vis the states.123  
As Professor Hannah Wiseman has noted, bypassing federalism may more 
accurately be described as the inevitable byproduct of regulating increasingly 
complex and interdependent electricity markets.124 The Court correctly noted 
in New York that the world is no longer “neatly divided into spheres of retail 
versus wholesale sales.”125 Initiatives undertaken in one corner of that world 
are likely to have ripple effects on adjacent markets. The friction that Jacobs 
describes is not so much a passive-aggressive attempt by FERC to bypass 
federalism, but instead an indictment of how poorly the Federal Power Act’s 
dual federalism model maps onto the realities of today’s complex electricity 
markets. FERC has discovered, intentionally or not, that modern electricity 
markets involve significant areas of concurrent jurisdiction.  
 
 120 Lyons, supra note 10, at 1648–49. 
 121 Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 885 (2015). 
 122 Id. at 889.  
 123 Id. at 889–90. 
 124 Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. BULL. 97, 97–100 (2015). 
 125 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 16 (2002) (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. 
FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
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II. DEFINING AND DEFENDING CONCURRENT JURISDICTION 
A. Defining Concurrent Jurisdiction 
The demise of dual federalism and the erosion of a traditionally 
impregnable sphere of state authority over the electricity industry have left 
some uncertainty regarding how courts should resolve competing jurisdictional 
claims. At the same time, the increasingly porous nature of the federal–state 
divide and the growing complexity of regulated industries have arguably 
increased the number of federalism-related disputes that courts must address. 
As cases such as New York v. FERC show,126 the Supreme Court recognizes 
the growing mismatch between the realities of modern electricity markets and 
the dual federalism model that has historically shaped its interpretation of 
federal energy laws. During the 2014–2016 Terms, a trilogy of cases seemed to 
signal a shift by the Court away from the increasingly anachronistic formalism 
of dual federalism and toward acceptance of the possibility that the statute can 
accept pockets of concurrent jurisdiction.127 
1. The Precursor: ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.  
The 2015 decision in ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.128 was the first to 
suggest the possibility that federal energy laws might be flexible enough to 
support concurrent jurisdiction. ONEOK arose out of trading practices during 
the 2000–2002 energy crisis.129 Respondents, who are purchasers of retail 
natural gas, alleged that the petitioners—natural gas traders—manipulated the 
natural gas market by reporting false sales data to trade publications and by 
artificially inflating sales volumes through wash sales.130 The purchasers 
argued that these practices violated various state antitrust laws and filed suit.131 
After removing the case to federal court, the traders sought summary judgment 
on the ground that the Natural Gas Act preempted the state law claims.132  
 
 126 Id. 
 127 See Rossi, supra note 6 (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions have moved toward finding 
concurrent jurisdiction in energy statutes and that relics of dual federalism should be shed in the interest of 
better regulation of modern energy markets). 
 128 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015). 
 129 Id. at 1598. 
 130 Id. at 1597–99. A “wash sale” is a sale wherein a trader agrees to execute a buy and simultaneously 
executes an equal and opposite sell on another trading platform. See id. at 1597. 
 131 Id. at 1598. 
 132 Id. 
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The preemption question upon which certiorari was granted presented the 
type of dilemma one can expect to arise with increasing frequency as the line 
between state and federal authority continues to erode. As noted above, the 
Natural Gas Act mimics the Federal Power Act’s attempt to divide jurisdiction 
between federal and state regulatory authorities.133 Section 1(b) of the Act 
gives FERC authority generally to regulate interstate and wholesale natural gas 
operations.134 It also contains a savings clause that explicitly preserves state 
regulatory authority over retail natural gas sales.135 But who has jurisdiction 
over the conduct in ONEOK, conduct that affects both wholesale and retail 
markets? 
Consistent with prior case law interpreting the Natural Gas Act through a 
dual federalism lens, the traders pressed a field preemption argument. They 
argued that the Court should find that the Natural Gas Act “occupie[s] the 
field” with regard to any conduct affecting wholesale rates.136 They found 
support for this argument in section 5(a) of the Act, which gives FERC 
authority over any “rule, regulation, practice or contract affecting” FERC 
jurisdictional rates.137 Because the conduct at issue affected wholesale prices as 
well as the retail prices that the respondents paid, the traders argued that any 
manipulation resulting from those practices fell within FERC’s exclusive 
jurisdiction.138 They noted that, following the energy crisis, FERC adopted a 
code of conduct that prohibited the very conduct at issue in this case.139 
Allowing state actions to proceed would risk state courts reaching conclusions 
about this conduct that are inconsistent with FERC’s rulings.140 As a result, 
they argued, the Court should find that the state law antitrust claims were 
preempted.141  
While the Court described these arguments as “forceful,” it ultimately 
decided that preemption was inappropriate in this case.142 Justice Breyer’s 
majority opinion acknowledged the Court’s prior holdings that, through the 
Natural Gas Act, “Congress occupied the field of matters relating to wholesale 
 
 133 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 134 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2012). 
 135 Id.; see Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n., 489 U.S. 493, 507 (1989). 
 136 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595. 
 137 Id. at 1596; see also 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a). 
 138 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
 139 Id. at 1598; see Amendments to Blanket Sales Certificates, 68 Fed. Reg. 66,323, 66,323–24 (Nov. 26, 
2003) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284). 
 140 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
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sales and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.”143 But the 
opinion also acknowledged that the Act was drafted “with meticulous regard 
for the continued exercise of state power.”144 Therefore, the Court explained, 
if, as here, a state law can apply both FERC-jurisdictional rates and rates 
outside FERC’s jurisdiction, courts should find preemption only when a 
detailed examination convincingly demonstrates that the matter falls within the 
preempted field.145 
In the process of rejecting this field preemption argument, the Court 
questioned whether it makes sense to continue interpreting the Act through a 
dual federalism lens. “Petitioners,” it noted, “argue that there is, or should be, a 
clear division between areas of state and federal authority in natural-gas 
regulation.”146 This argument, the Court noted, described a “Platonic ideal” 
and did not capture the realities of regulatory overlap caused by the modern 
natural gas industry.147 Instead, the Court framed the relevant inquiry as 
focusing upon the “target at which the state law aims.”148 If the state law is 
aimed directly at interstate purchasers or wholesalers, which are subject to 
FERC jurisdiction, the Court would likely conclude that the Natural Gas Act 
preempts it.149 However, when the state law is aimed primarily at protecting 
producers or retail sales, which are both firmly on the states’ side of the line, 
the regulation should not be preempted, even if it might have some effect on 
FERC-jurisdictional rates.150 In ONEOK, the Court held that because the 
lawsuits were focused on retail sales, which are within the state’s purview, and 
because state antitrust laws at issue aimed at all businesses in the marketplace 
rather than just FERC-jurisdictional entities, the Natural Gas Act did not 
preempt those claims.151 
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts.152 Echoing 
themes of traditional dual federalism, the dissent took issue with the majority’s 
focus on the purpose of state regulation.153 The relevant inquiry, Justice Scalia 
 
 143 Id. at 1594 (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 305 (1988)). 
 144 Id. at 1599 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517–18 
(1947)). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 1601. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 1599 (emphasis omitted). 
 149 Id. at 1600. 
 150 See id. 
 151 Id. at 1600–01. 
 152 Id. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 153 Id. 
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wrote, should be on “whether the matter on which the State asserts the right to 
act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.”154 Here, because the matter 
involves wholesale rates, which the NGA puts on the federal side of the line, 
the dissent would have found the state law preempted.155 The majority’s 
purposive approach, Justice Scalia wrote, sacrifices the clarity of dual 
federalism in favor of a “make-it-up-as-you-go-along approach to preemption” 
that he predicted will “prove unworkable in practice.”156 
2. Recognizing Concurrent Jurisdiction over Electricity Markets: FERC 
v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n 
The following Term, Justice Kagan’s opinion in FERC v. Electric Power 
Supply Ass’n157 (EPSA) signaled that ONEOK was not an isolated decision, 
using language that even more forcefully rejected the dual federalism 
framework. At issue in EPSA was FERC’s demand-response initiative. To 
balance supply and demand in wholesale electricity markets during periods of 
peak energy use, FERC enacted a demand-response rule that pays large 
consumers of electricity to “dial down their consumption” if the price of 
reducing demand is less than the cost of paying electricity suppliers to add 
more energy to the grid.158 The petitioner, a trade association representing 
electricity generators, challenged the rule as an impermissible intrusion on 
state authority.159 By paying retail customers not to consume electricity, it 
argued, FERC has “usurped state power” over retail markets, “lured” retail 
consumers into wholesale markets, and effectively increased retail rates by 
creating an opportunity cost for retail consumers who choose to forego a 
demand-response payment.160 
The D.C. Circuit, applying a traditional dual federalism framework, had 
rejected the demand-response program as an unwarranted intrusion onto 
matters reserved exclusively for the states.161 The court noted the traditional 
recognition that the Federal Power Act “split[s] [jurisdiction over the sale and 
delivery of electricity] between the federal government and the states on the 
 
 154 Id. at 1604 (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 (1988)). 
 155 Id. (“Straightforward application of these precedents would make short work of the case at hand.”). 
 156 Id. at 1603. 
 157 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
 158 Id. at 767. 
 159 See id. at 777–79. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). 
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basis of the type of service being provided and the nature of the energy sale”162 
and that “FERC’s jurisdiction over the sale of electricity has been specifically 
confined to the wholesale market.”163 But demand response, explained the 
circuit court, is not a “wholesale sale of electricity.”164 Rather, it is a payment 
to reduce retail demand and therefore “directly regulat[es] a matter subject to 
state control,” namely “the retail market.”165 The D.C. Circuit rejected FERC’s 
argument that it had jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that demand response 
indirectly affects wholesale rates, noting that such a theory “has no limiting 
principle” and was therefore inconsistent with the statutory design.166 
The Supreme Court disagreed, with Justice Kagan’s majority opinion 
directly and forcefully rejecting this dual federalism approach to FERC’s 
jurisdictional quandary. Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court did not 
focus on whether the federal agency had intruded upon an area of the market 
reserved to the states. Instead, the Court asked whether the Federal Power Act 
gives FERC a jurisdictional hook to support its rule.167 Unlike the D.C. Circuit, 
it accepted the argument that demand response was permissible because it was 
a practice that “affected” FERC-jurisdictional wholesale rates.168 The Court 
acknowledged the D.C. Circuit’s concern about the potentially unbounded 
nature of this jurisdictional grant but answered by holding that FERC could 
only undertake initiatives that “directly” affect FERC-jurisdictional rates—a 
standard that the Court found was met here “with room to spare.”169 
The Court acknowledged petitioner’s concern, echoed in the lower court 
opinion, that FERC’s demand-response program would affect retail sales, 
which lie within state regulators’ purview.170 But in a passage that is jarring to 
students of energy federalism, the opinion boldly declares that this fact is “of 
no legal consequence.”171 The Court explained that an otherwise permissible 
federal initiative does not run afoul of the Federal Power Act’s jurisdictional 
limits “just because it affects—even substantially—the quantity or terms of 
 
 162 Id. at 219 (alterations in original) (quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 822, 
824 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 163 Id. (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 19 (2002)). 
 164 Id. at 221. 
 165 Id. at 222. 
 166 Id. at 221. 
 167 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016). 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See id. at 776. 
 171 Id. 
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retail sales.”172 Echoing New York v. FERC, the Court noted that “[i]t is a fact 
of economic life that the wholesale and retail markets in electricity, as in every 
other known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other. To the 
contrary, transactions that occur on the wholesale market have natural 
consequences at the retail level.”173 Section 201(b) prohibits FERC from 
directly regulating generation facilities, local distribution, and purely intrastate 
transmission lines.174 Regardless, the majority held, “[w]hen FERC regulates 
what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying out its charge to 
improve how that market runs, then no matter the effect on retail rates, [section 
201(b)] imposes no bar.”175 
Unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia once again dissented, in what became his 
final published opinion. As in ONEOK, Justice Scalia focused categorically on 
whom the initiative seeks to regulate, rather than what the purpose of the 
initiative might be. Quoting earlier dual federalism cases, Justice Scalia wrote 
that the Act “cuts sharply and cleanly between sales for resale and direct sales 
for consumptive uses. No exceptions are made in either category for particular 
uses, quantities, or otherwise.”176 FERC’s demand-response initiative seeks to 
regulate retail consumers in an attempt to persuade them not to consume 
electricity in retail markets.177 Because it regulates entities on the state side of 
the line, Justice Scalia found the program beyond FERC’s purview.178 
3. Limits on Concurrent Jurisdiction: Hughes v. Talen Energy 
Marketing 
Shortly after deciding EPSA, the Court announced a potential limiting 
principle on concurrent jurisdiction in Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, 
LLC.179 At issue in Hughes was Maryland’s initiative to stimulate the 
construction of new electricity generation facilities within the state. Maryland 
has several older coal-fired power plants that are scheduled to be phased out 
under the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan.180 The state 
 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2012). 
 175 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776. 
 176 Id. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 
U.S. 507, 517 (1947)). 
 177 Id.  
 178 Id. 
 179 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
 180 See Robert Walton, What the Hughes v. Talen Energy Supreme Court Decision Means for State 
Power Incentives, UTILITYDIVE (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-the-hughes-v-talen-
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was concerned that existing FERC auctions failed to provide sufficient 
incentives to build new electricity generators in the state, and, because 
Maryland is on a particularly congested portion of the electricity grid, it is 
difficult to meet demand by importing electricity from other states.181 In 
response, the state subsidized new electricity generation by guaranteeing new 
generators a fixed contract price for electric capacity.182 The generators sell 
their electricity on wholesale markets governed by FERC, but if the wholesale 
price at which the electricity is sold is below the contract price, Maryland 
utilities make up the difference as a subsidy payment.183  
Opponents of Maryland’s plan asserted, and the Court agreed, that the plan 
impermissibly interfered with wholesale electricity rates, over which FERC 
has “exclusive jurisdiction.”184 Quoting EPSA, the Court acknowledged that 
“[s]ince the FPA’s passage, electricity has increasingly become a competitive 
interstate business, and FERC’s role has evolved accordingly.”185 Justice 
Ginsburg’s majority opinion reiterated ONEOK’s holding that states “may 
regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws 
incidentally affect areas within FERC’s domain.”186 The key inquiry under 
ONEOK is determining “the target at which the state aims.”187 To answer that 
question, the Court focused on the fact that the Maryland subsidy required the 
generator to sell its capacity in FERC-regulated wholesale auctions, but 
guaranteed that the generator would receive the contract price—rather than the 
auction price—for that capacity.188 The program thus set an interstate 
wholesale rate, an activity that the Federal Power Act vests exclusively in 
FERC.189  
But unlike pre-ONEOK cases that painted federal preemption with a broad 
brush, the Court closed by carefully explaining that its holding was narrow: 
Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s program only 
because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC. 
 
supreme-court-decision-means-for-state-power-incen/418046/ (providing background about Maryland’s 
initiative). 
 181 See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 182 Id. at 1295. 
 183 Id. New Jersey, whose generation markets are similarly threatened by the Clean Power Plan, had 
enacted a similar subsidy program. Id. at 1295 n.4.  
 184 Id. at 1297. 
 185 Id. at 1292 (quoting FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016)). 
 186 Id. at 1298. 
 187 Id. (quoting ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015)). 
 188 Id. at 1297. 
 189 Id. 
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We therefore need not and do not address the permissibility of 
various other measures States might employ to encourage 
development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives, 
land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation 
facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing in this 
opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States from 
encouraging production of new or clean generation through measures 
untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation. So long 
as a State does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing 
the auction, the State’s program would not suffer from the fatal 
defect that renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.190 
4. From Hemispheres to a Venn Diagram 
Read together, this trilogy signals a significant shift in the law governing 
energy federalism. First, the Court has explicitly abandoned the increasingly 
anachronistic notion, central to the dual federalism model, that the energy 
statutes divide the world into two separate, mutually exclusive realms of 
authority.191 All three cases reject the notion that a clear, bright line separates 
state and federal jurisdiction over energy law issues; rather, the Court 
recognizes—and is seemingly comfortable with the idea—that federal and state 
authorities may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over a particular practice or 
entity.192  
One can describe this jurisprudential change visually. Dual federalism 
imagines the energy industry as a single circle bisected by a line that creates 
two distinct hemispheres of federal and state authority. Each hemisphere is 
hermetically sealed from the other, and together they provide a comprehensive 
regulatory scheme for the industry. By comparison, the current Court might 
more accurately describe energy federalism as a Venn diagram with two 
overlapping circles. While the energy statutes contemplate areas of exclusive 
state and federal authority (the crescent-shaped portions on either end of the 
Venn diagram), the trilogy of cases described above acknowledge that many—
perhaps most—activities by market participants are subject to regulation by 
either sovereign or both. When state or federal regulators act within this zone 
of shared regulatory authority, courts are unlikely to interfere merely because 
 
 190 Id. at 1299 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 191 ONEOK,135 S. Ct. at 1599–600. 
 192 See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298; FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 776 
(2016); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1601 (2015). 
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federal initiatives may incidentally affect ongoing state efforts and vice 
versa.193 
So how can one determine whether an activity falls within the overlapping 
area or remains the exclusive province of FERC or its state analogues? The 
trilogy suggests that the key question is the purpose of the regulation at issue. 
This contrasts with the dual federalism approach of asking whether the 
regulation had effects outside its sphere. The shift from effects to intent is 
present in all three cases. ONEOK explained that the relevant inquiry is “the 
target at which the state law aims.”194 The Court permitted the state law claims 
at issue in that case because the state antitrust law was one of general 
applicability and the suits were focused on conduct in the retail market, even 
though that conduct affected wholesale rates as well.195 The Court in EPSA 
was more explicit: it approved FERC’s demand-response program because the 
agency’s goal was to directly affect the wholesale rate; the fact that it also had 
some impact on state markets was “of no legal consequence.”196 In contrast, 
Maryland’s cardinal sin in Hughes was to create a subsidy that sought to set 
the wholesale rate that the subsidized generators would receive.197 Because the 
state intended to regulate an activity in the federal sphere, the subsidy was 
preempted—but the court explained that such subsidies would be permissible 
if “untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation.”198 
The focus upon the regulator’s intent rather than the regulation’s effects is 
consistent with decisions in other regulated industries. For example, in In re 
FCC 11–161,199 a coalition of states and regulated entities challenged a Federal 
Communications Commission order that denied federal universal service fund 
subsidies to telephone companies whose local telephone rates fell below a 
Commission-established floor rate.200 The subsidy was designed to offset the 
high fixed costs of rural telephone companies to keep telephone service 
affordable in rural areas. The Commission concluded that the floor was 
necessary so the subsidy did not flow to carriers whose rates were already 
affordable.201 Petitioners argued that because affected carriers would raise 
local rates to the federal floor to avoid losing the subsidy, “the de facto effect 
 
 193 See, e.g., EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776; ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
 194 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599. 
 195 Id. at 1600–01. 
 196 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776. 
 197 Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. 
 198 Id. (citation omitted). 
 199 753 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 200 Id. at 1067. 
 201 Id. (citation omitted). 
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of the Order” was to set local telephone rates, which under the 
Communications Act is a power that lies exclusively within the purview of 
state regulators.202 The Tenth Circuit rejected this challenge and explained that 
“no canon of administrative law requires [a reviewing court] to view the 
regulatory scope of agency actions in terms of their practical or even 
foreseeable effects.”203 Because the court was “not bound to examine the 
‘practical effect’ of an agency order,” it “summarily reject[ed]” the 
challenge.204 
Similarly, other regulatory utility cases reflect the distinction made in 
ONEOK between laws of general applicability and laws targeted at regulated 
entities. In Cellco Partnership v. Hatch, telephone companies challenged a 
Minnesota statute that prohibited wireless providers from increasing a 
customer’s rate unless the customer was notified sixty days in advance and 
opted in to the new rate.205 The telephone companies claimed that the statute 
regulated wireless telephone rates, which—unlike local landline rates at issue 
in In re FCC 11-161—the Communications Act places exclusively within the 
FCC’s purview.206 Minnesota replied that the statute was a consumer 
protection measure, which the Act permits states to regulate.207 The Eighth 
Circuit sided with the companies and found that the statute was preempted, in 
part because it targeted the pricing behavior of wireless companies in 
particular.208 Unlike in ONEOK, the statute in question was not a generally 
applicable consumer protection measure.209 Rather, the court noted that the 
statute “goes beyond traditional requirements of contract law” and prohibited 
wireless companies from engaging in practices that other entities were free to 
adopt under Minnesota law.210 As in Hughes, the deliberate targeting of a 
federally regulated activity rendered the state law more susceptible to 
preemption.211  
 
 202 Id. (citation omitted). 
 203 Id. at 1068 (quoting Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
 204 Id. 
 205 431 F.3d 1077, 1079–81 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 206 Id. at 1080–82; see also 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 207 Cellco, 431 F.3d at 1082.  
 208 Id. at 1083. 
 209 Compare ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1601 (2015) (declining to find state antitrust 
laws preempted in part because of their broad scope), with Cellco, 431 F.3d at 1083 (finding a state 
communications law preempted in part because it targeted a single industry). 
 210 Cellco, 431 F.3d at 1083. 
 211 Compare Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (“We reject 
Maryland’s program only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by FERC.”), with Cellco, 
431 F.3d at 1083 (“This statute effectively voids the terms of contracts currently used by providers in one 
industry, and substitutes by statute a different contractual arrangement.”). 
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B. Defending Concurrent Jurisdiction  
As Professor Rossi and others have discussed,212 one important effect of 
the shift toward concurrent jurisdiction is an emphasis on functionalism rather 
than formalism to settle future jurisdictional disputes.213 If the court’s primary 
inquiry is into the intent of the regulation in question,214 future jurisdictional 
disputes are likely to be decided by “a case-by-case analysis” of the regulator’s 
purpose.215 This is, of course, precisely the common-law-like approach 
eschewed by earlier dual federalism decisions.216 
It is perhaps unsurprising that this shift began in ONEOK with a 
disagreement between Justices Breyer and Scalia, as the latter has often 
opposed the former’s bent toward functionalism (which he snidely derided as a 
“make-it-up-as-you-go-along approach to preemption”).217 Consistent with his 
preference for rules over standards,218 Justice Scalia long advocated for field 
preemption as a powerful tool to resolve jurisdictional disputes.219 The benefits 
of this approach are clarity and uniformity: field preemption leaves little 
uncertainty about whether a state may regulate within a sphere, and a uniform 
federal approach in those areas that Congress has chosen to regulate minimizes 
the risk of an actor being subject to multiple, potentially inconsistent 
regimes.220 These themes weighed heavily in cases decided during the dual 
federalism era, when uniformity and clarity were virtues benefitting the smooth 
operation of stable, static vertically integrated electric companies.221 Justice 
Scalia’s dissents in ONEOK and EPSA thus expose some significant risks 
associated with the shift toward concurrent jurisdiction: competition among 
 
 212 See generally Rossi, supra note 6 (describing the Court’s shift towards a concurrent jurisdiction 
framework). 
 213 See Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity Industry of the 
Future, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 102 (2016). See generally Rossi, supra note 6. 
 214 See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599; see also Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 
(2016) (quoting ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599). 
 215 See ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 216 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964). 
 217 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 218 See generally Scalia, supra note 19 (arguing in favor of establishing clear rules for judges to follow 
rather than standards which provide room for judicial discretion). 
 219 See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 786 (2016) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1604 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 220 See, e.g., Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal Preemption, 
39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 316–17 (2003) (noting that “preemption can . . . shield against . . . inconsistent 
standards”). 
 221 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n, 376 U.S. at 215–16 (noting that “Congress meant to draw a bright line 
easily ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction, making unnecessary such case-by-case analysis”); 
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947) (making a similar argument). 
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regulators may prove unworkable in practice and the potential for dual masters 
jeopardizes the stability that investors crave when funding high-fixed-cost 
industries such as electricity.222 
But in today’s complex and fast-moving energy markets, stability is 
probably less important than flexibility—which favors common-law-like 
standards over more rigid rules.223 As Justice Kagan emphasized in EPSA, a 
helpful and common sense policy initiative could be hindered by over- or 
under- inclusive jurisdictional rules that prevent actors from acting.224 Justice 
Kagan also noted that demand response is an eminently reasonable policy 
initiative to solve the problem of peak demand—even the FERC 
Commissioner who dissented from its adoption on jurisdictional grounds 
conceded that the program’s purpose was sound.225 It would be unfortunate, 
she wrote, for rigid, inflexible rules such as those promoted by the dissent to 
prevent the public from taking advantage of beneficial policy initiatives.226 
After all, if, as the dissent suggested, FERC cannot undertake demand response 
at the wholesale level because of its effect on retail markets, neither could 
states impose wholesale demand response because that would be 
impermissibly regulating wholesale markets.227 This leaves a regulatory gap in 
which good policy cannot be achieved—and it was precisely to avoid a similar 
regulatory gap in Attleboro that Congress first elected to enact the Federal 
Power Act.228 
Overall, the Court’s embrace of concurrent jurisdiction aligns federalism 
doctrine more closely with the realities of the modern electricity industry. The 
effect—indeed, the goal—of the great transformation (in electricity and other 
infrastructure industries) was to make static, unchanging electricity markets 
more nimble, disruptive, and competitive.229 The rigid formalism of the dual 
 
 222 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 787–88 (Scalia, J., dissenting); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 223 Cf. Scalia, supra note 19, at 1180–81. 
 224 See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780. 
 225 See id. at 781; see also Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 
76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,679 (Mar. 24, 2011) (Moeller, Comm’r, dissenting) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) 
(“While the merits of various methods for compensating demand response were discussed at length in the 
course of this rulemaking, nowhere did I review any comment or hear any testimony that questioned the 
benefit of having demand response resources participate in the organized wholesale energy markets. On this 
point, there is no debate. The fact is that demand response plays a very important role in these markets by 
providing significant economic, reliability, and other market-related benefits.”).  
 226 EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 781. 
 227 Id. at 780 n.10. 
 228 Id. at 767, 780; see Rossi, supra note 6, at 408–10. 
 229 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 10, at 1325–26. 
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federalism model is ill-suited to govern such a dynamic economic 
environment. Concurrent jurisdiction is more flexible and adaptable to 
changing market conditions. The line between federal and state jurisdiction is 
no longer drawn in broad strokes by law interpreting general statutory phrases, 
but instead by the fine point of policy judgments about the regime under 
consideration.230  
C. Concurrent Jurisdiction’s Threat to Energy Federalism 
But while recognition of concurrent jurisdiction aligns judicial doctrine 
more closely with the realities of the modern electricity industry, it raises 
important questions about the future of energy federalism, particularly for state 
officials. The embrace of concurrent jurisdiction is effectively a form of 
judicial minimalism: at least within the area of the Venn diagram where courts 
recognize overlapping authority, the law will no longer protect states from 
intrusion as frequently as it did under the dual federalism regime. As Professor 
Rossi discusses, within the judicially cognizable sphere of concurrent 
jurisdiction, the ultimate line between state and federal authority becomes a 
political or policy question, rather than a legal one.231  
To understand the effect on states of the Court’s embrace of concurrent 
jurisdiction, one must examine the ramifications of this change in the political 
sphere. If concurrent jurisdiction draws jurisdictional boundaries based upon 
policy judgments rather than statutory interpretation or broader federalism 
principles, this means that FERC is likely the most influential decision maker 
to define the limits on state power (at least within the sphere of authority that 
courts identify as concurrent). While Congress always has the option to amend 
or augment the Federal Power Act by statute, FERC will realistically make 
most of the individual policy judgments that directly affect the states.  
Therefore, the risk to states under a concurrent jurisdiction scheme depends 
upon the likelihood that FERC will recognize federalism values and provide 
sufficient opportunities for state input into its decision making. Professors 
Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld argue that agencies such as FERC are 
structurally more capable than Congress or courts at taking federalism values 
into consideration when considering regulatory matters.232 First, they argue 
that agency decision making is transparent: the Administrative Procedure Act 
 
 230 Rossi, supra note 6, at 402–03. 
 231 See id. at 407. 
 232 See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and 
Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1938 (2008). 
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and other procedural mandates require agencies to act in the public eye, 
particularly through the notice-and-comment process, giving adequate notice 
of potential agency action before making binding decisions.233 Second, 
agencies are deliberative: they are intimately familiar with the subject of 
regulation and, through the notice-and-comment process, can easily be 
informed of the effect a proposed rule would have on state interests.234 Finally, 
they are at least indirectly politically accountable to congressional and 
presidential oversight, which can help correct agency excesses.235 
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld are correct that the Administrative 
Procedure Act contains substantial procedural requirements to assure that 
interested parties (including state regulators) will be heard before the agency 
takes action; however, by vesting questions about optimal jurisdictional 
analysis primarily in agency hands, there remain risks to federalism. One is the 
sheer volume of agency action: agencies face fewer veto gates than Congress 
(which must go through bicameralism and presentment before it can act) or 
courts (which can only act upon cases presented to them), meaning agencies 
will make many more decisions and therefore will have more opportunities to 
intrude on state interests.236 Moreover, there is no intrinsic state perspective 
helping to guide the decision maker. While it is important not to put too much 
emphasis on the political safeguards of federalism, one should note that 
Congress is comprised of representatives elected from the states and therefore, 
at the margin, is more likely to be sensitive to state concerns than federal 
agencies, whose constituency is national in scope.237 
Moreover, federal law recognizes two doctrines that give FERC and other 
federal agencies the upper hand in political power struggles with their state 
counterparts. The first is the power to preempt state law, which has been the 
subject of criticism from scholars who argue that agencies should not be 
permitted to preempt state law without clear authority from Congress.238 This 
means that in the event of a political struggle between agencies and state 
 
 233 Id. at 1955–57. 
 234 Id. at 1975–77. 
 235 Id. at 1981–83. 
 236 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 750, 
753–57 (2008). 
 237 While some federal regulators are indeed drawn from the ranks of their state counterparts, this is not 
a requirement of FERC Commissioners. See, e.g., Biography: Chairman Kevin J. McIntyre, FED. ENERGY 
REG. COMMISSION, https://www.ferc.gov/about/com-mem/mcintyre/mcintyre-bio.asp (last updated Mar. 
13, 2018) (“Prior to joining the Commission, Chairman McIntyre was the co-leader of the global Energy 
Practice at the law firm Jones Day, where he practiced law for most of his nearly 30-year legal career.”). 
 238 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 232, at 1937 (summarizing the debate). 
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interests, the tie will go to the federal authority by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause.239 
The second is the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguities in the agency’s organic 
statute.240 Relevant to this discussion, the Court recently clarified that Chevron 
applies to an agency’s interpretation of the jurisdictional limits that the organic 
statute places upon its authority.241 This doctrine suggests that courts are less 
likely to apply a critical eye to federal jurisdictional claims and, as many 
commentators argue, creates incentives for agencies to aggrandize authority at 
the expense of their state counterparts.242 Professor Philip Weiser has argued 
that courts should give Chevron deference to state agency interpretations of 
federal statutes for the same reasons we extend it to federal agency 
interpretations.243 But this approach has not caught on, meaning that, on the 
whole, courts will scrutinize state claims to authority more closely than they 
will scrutinize federal claims. 
III. NEGOTIATING ENERGY FEDERALISM IN A WORLD OF CONCURRENT 
JURISDICTION 
Therefore one likely effect of the Supreme Court’s trilogy will be to shift 
the primary battleground for energy federalism from the courtroom to the 
political arena. 
This Part examines the effect this shift in terrain will likely have on the 
ability of state officials to advocate for their preferred policy outcomes. 
Despite the difficulties states will face as FERC becomes the primary arbiter of 
the line between federal and state authority,244 this Part highlights the 
continued importance of regulatory federalism in modern electricity 
markets.245 Drawing upon recent scholarship in negotiation theory, it then 
highlights several tools that state regulators can and do use to “negotiate 
 
 239 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 240 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). 
 241 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 299–301 (2013). 
 242 See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, 
Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2009) (discussing the 
phenomena of agencies taking self-aggrandizing positions and noting that “[a]gencies might focus on matters 
that advance their own institutional interests, as distinct from the interests Congress tasked them with 
serving”). 
 243 Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 3–4 (1999). 
 244 See supra text accompanying notes 231–43. 
 245 See infra text accompanying notes 247–75. 
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federalism” by influencing the development of energy law in ways that reflect 
ongoing state concerns.246 
A. The Ongoing Importance of Energy Federalism 
Importantly, the question of proper allocation of authority between federal 
and state regulators regarding energy law issues does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional concern. The Court in FERC v. Mississippi correctly noted that 
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to preempt electricity 
markets completely and eliminate any state regulation in this area.247 Therefore 
the discussion below about how best to negotiate federalism involves the 
policy question of how best to divide jurisdiction within constitutionally 
permissible parameters. This is independent of the question of whether 
political safeguards of federalism are sufficient to patrol the constitutional 
boundary between state and federal power, a topic that is (far) beyond the 
scope of this Article.248 
But given that Congress could federalize the entire electricity industry, it 
seems important to ask at the outset whether the American public is served by 
the ongoing presence of state regulators. In other infrastructure industries 
affected by the Great Transformation—telecommunications, for example—
increased competition, and greater economies of scale have led to the reduction 
or even elimination of state regulation.249 What benefits do we receive from 
ongoing state oversight in the electricity sector? While federalism scholars 
have identified a wide range of rationales for the preservation of state 
 
 246 See infra text accompanying notes 274–344. 
 247 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982). 
 248 See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in 
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (giving a seminal 
account of federalism’s “political safeguards”); Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of 
Federalism’s Political Safeguards, 119 HARV. L. REV. 609 (2005) (arguing that states have political incentives 
to surrender authority to federal officials and therefore political safeguards are insufficient to patrol the 
constitutional boundary between federal and state power). 
 249 See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 10 (arguing that modern telecommunications markets are largely regional 
in scope, suggesting the need for a more circumscribed role for state regulators); Daniel A. Lyons, Technology 
Convergence and Federalism: The Case of VoIP Regulation, 1 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM ONLINE 56 (2012) 
(arguing that ongoing state regulation of telecommunications service can jeopardize technological 
advancement in VoIP service). 
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autonomy,250 three stand out in the electricity context: diversity and local 
knowledge, experimentation, and state capacity and expertise.251 
1. Diversity and Local Knowledge 
One risk of national uniformity is the loss of potentially significant 
distinctions among regional subpopulations. Preserving a zone of local 
authority can help assure that policy decisions account for differentiation 
among various regions of the country. The Supreme Court has explained that 
federalism helps assure that government “will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogeneous society.”252 Because they are responsible for a 
smaller number of constituents, state decision makers have greater local 
knowledge about the ways in which a state differs from the nation as a whole, 
facts which might be lost on a regulator viewing issues from a national 
perspective. 
As I have discussed elsewhere, regional diversity should and does play an 
important role in energy policy.253 Although it is no longer accurate to describe 
electricity markets as primarily intrastate, it is equally mistaken to assume they 
are national in scope. Unlike in telecommunications, where regulatory reform 
and technological innovation created a largely national market for telephone 
and Internet service, today’s electricity markets are primarily regional in 
scope.254 What is often described colloquially as “the electricity grid” is in fact 
three separate grids covering the continental United States that are only 
minimally connected with one another.255 Within these three 
“interconnections” lie approximately 130 separate balancing authorities, each 
 
 250 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007) (discussing rationales for preserving state 
autonomy).  
 251 As Professors Galle and Seidenfeld note, one can identify two distinct sets of federalism values. The 
first, which some commentators have dubbed “abstract federalism,” can be described as political- or rights-
oriented. This category encompasses the bundle of benefits citizens receive from the continued existence of 
states as rivals to federal power, such as keeping the risk of federal tyranny at bay. The second, more concrete, 
set of values focuses upon the effect of state authority to help produce better public policy outcomes. Galle & 
Seidenfeld, supra note 232, at 1941–42. Because preemption of energy law does not materially affect the 
continued ability of state governments generally to provide the benefits of abstract federalism, this Article 
focuses on the latter bundle of values.  
 252 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). 
 253 Lyons, supra note 10, at 1652. 
 254 Id. at 1648. 
 255 Id. at 1648–49. 
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of which is responsible for matching electricity supply and demand within a 
specific geographic area on a real-time basis.256 
Regional differences can have a significant effect on energy policy. One 
need not look further than the Hughes decision. Because Maryland was more 
dependent than other states on older coal-fired power plants that are scheduled 
for retirement by the Federal Clean Power Plan, it faced a larger potential 
generator shortage than other states.257 And, while other states could make up 
that shortfall by importing power, Maryland’s placement within a particularly 
congested portion of the PJM Interconnection made it difficult for that state to 
do so.258 As a result, FERC wholesale auction rules that were designed to 
incentivize efficient electricity generation nationally were insufficient to meet 
Maryland’s future generation needs.259 While the Court rejected Maryland’s 
specific plan to lure new generation by using contracts tied to FERC wholesale 
auction prices, it specifically encouraged the state to use its authority in other 
ways to meet this unique need.260 
Similarly, geographic differences can affect the optimal fuel mix for 
electricity generation within a region. They can affect the choice between 
traditional and renewable energy, and can affect the choice of which forms of 
renewable energy are optimal.261 In Texas and the Midwest, an abundance of 
wind resources has driven construction of wind farms—which in Texas 
support intrastate load centers,262 while Midwestern wind resources face the 
challenge of adding transmission capacity to reach load centers in other 
states.263 Wind turbine construction is less common in southern states, but the 
ecology of the area makes it a unique environment to test biomass-based 
generation that is not viable in other parts of the country.264 Meanwhile, an 
abundance of fossil fuels in coal-dense states like West Virginia makes 
renewable energy less cost-effective as a substitute for traditional energy 
resources.265 
 
 256 Id. at 1650. 
 257 See Walton, supra note 180. 
 258 Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016). 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 1299. 
 261 Lyons, supra note 10, at 1654. 
 262 See id. at 1649 (noting that Texas is on the separate ERCOT interconnection, unconnected to other 
states, and discussing the state’s Competitive Renewables Energy Zones). 
 263 See id. at 1623 (“Renewable energy potential is highest in the Midwest and southwestern states, 
where wind and sunshine are abundant. But it is likely to be consumed by load centers several hundred miles 
away.”). 
 264 Id. at 1654. 
 265 Id. at 1665. 
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Finally, local policies can reflect different cultural mores across regions. 
For example, states have set different renewable portfolio standards, which 
dictate the minimum amount of electricity generation that a local utility must 
source from renewable resources such as wind and solar. California has set an 
aggressive target of 33% of its energy from renewable resources by 2020 and 
50% by 2030.266 By comparison, North Carolina has targeted merely 12.5% by 
2021, while states such as Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia have declined to 
adopt a minimum requirement.267 While renewable energy is considered more 
environmentally friendly than traditional fossil fuels (because it generates little 
to no carbon emissions), it is also more expensive per megawatt than 
traditional energy.268 Arguably, the different standards reflect the premium that 
a local population is willing to pay for more environmentally friendly energy 
consumption. Californians are willing to pay a significant premium to reduce 
the state’s carbon footprint; populations in southern states are less willing to 
make that tradeoff, and their values are reflected in the choices made by their 
state policymakers. 
2. Experimentation 
Another risk of national uniformity is that by choosing one solution to a 
public policy problem, the regulator might overlook potentially superior 
alternatives. Justice Brandeis famously highlighted that federalism allows 
states to experiment with different potential solutions to public policy 
problems. “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system,” he wrote, 
“that a single courageous [s]tate may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.”269  
In the electricity context, numerous federal initiatives began as state-level 
public policy experiments that allowed observers to test the viability of a 
potential solution before imposing it upon the rest of the country. For example, 
before FERC adopted the wholesale demand-response program at issue in 
EPSA, several states had experimented with demand-response programs to 
 
 266 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.30(c)(2) (West Supp. 2018). 
 267 See Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE FOR ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & 
EFFICIENCY (Aug. 2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable-
Portfolio-Standards.pdf (giving an overview of the renewable portfolio standard policies of states and 
territories). 
 268 See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1636 (describing the comparative costs of fossil fuel and renewable 
energy). 
 269 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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curtail peak-time demand at the retail level,270 a fact that Justice Scalia noted in 
his dissent.271 Professor Jacobs notes that these experiments “highlighted best 
practices” for successful demand-response strategies for utilities and identified 
“pitfalls to avoid,”272 which FERC could look to when enacting its own 
wholesale-level program. Professors Hari Osofsky and Hannah Wiseman have 
similarly documented how state-level efforts to improve the reliability of the 
electricity grid led to the formation of the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation, which FERC designated as its official organization to ensure 
transmission grid reliability in 2005.273 
3. Capacity and Expertise 
Finally, Professor Erin Ryan highlights the advantages of state regulators’ 
additional capacity and expertise.274 By virtue of their long history in the 
industry, state regulators have expertise in managing those areas of the grid 
that lay within their borders. And the fifty state public utility commissions 
collectively have greater capacity to act than FERC, whose reach is limited by 
time and budgetary constraints.275 The existence of state regulators therefore 
helps mitigate the risk that a public policy dilemma will go unattended because 
of natural limits on the federal regulator’s capacity. 
B. Negotiating Federalism: A Taxonomy of Options for States to Bargain 
with FERC 
Thus, it is important that states maintain an active presence in electricity 
regulation, despite the potential difficulties posed by the decline in judicially 
enforceable jurisdictional limits. But these difficulties are only one facet of the 
federalism struggle. While EPSA allows FERC a freer hand to enact programs 
like demand response that may intrude on state interests, ONEOK similarly 
invites states to regulate conduct that traditionally would have fallen within 
FERC’s portfolio. And in addition to these new unilateral assertions of 
authority, the Court’s recognition of concurrent jurisdiction implicitly opens 
 
 270 See Jacobs, supra note 121, at 905–06 (discussing state-level efforts). 
 271 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 788 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 272 Jacobs, supra note 121, at 906. 
 273 Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 36–37 
(2014). For additional examples of the benefits of state experimentation in electricity markets, see generally 
William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy Innovation in Public 
Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016).  
 274 Ryan, supra note 25, at 78–81, 90. 
 275 See id. at 90 (“[S]tates thus wield powerful leverage in spending power negotiations because they 
control a reservoir of local expertise, resources, and authority that federal counterparts cannot replicate . . . .”).  
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the door for greater bilateral action as well. Going forward, jurisdictional 
boundaries will not be decided, but negotiated.  
Examining energy federalism as a negotiation rather than as a matter of 
statutory interpretation provides a more complete view of how states will fare 
in the era of concurrent jurisdiction. As Professor Ryan has noted, while many 
contemporary theorists treat federalism as a unilateral, zero-sum competition, 
the reality is that “the boundary between state and federal authority is actually 
negotiated on scales large and small, and on a continual basis.”276 By focusing 
on jurisdictional overlap not as a struggle between sovereigns but as a 
negotiation—directly or indirectly—across federal–state lines, one recognizes 
greater opportunities for cooperation and gains a more complete picture of the 
reality of policymaking in complex regulatory environments.  
Indeed, states have numerous tools available with which they may 
negotiate with FERC—and in fact have been doing so regularly since PURPA 
set the electricity industry down the path toward restructuring almost four 
decades ago. What follows is a non-exhaustive list of options that state 
regulators can use to cajole, convince, and cooperate with their federal 
counterparts in the messy negotiations over jurisdictional boundaries. 
1. Litigation 
Despite the Court’s seeming willingness to avoid strict enforcement of the 
traditional jurisdictional boundaries between federal and state actors, litigation 
remains a viable strategy through which states can exert pressure on FERC. 
Professor Ryan notes that even when statutory lines are clear, the use of 
lawsuits can be a viable indirect negotiating tactic.277 While the Court has 
recognized a zone of concurrent jurisdiction, the Federal Power Act still 
imposes a defined limit on federal authority and carves out a zone of authority 
reserved exclusively for the states (one of the crescents in the Venn Diagram 
referenced above).278 As noted above, FERC is prohibited by statute from 
regulating local generation, local distribution, and purely intrastate 
transmission lines.279 The Court in EPSA also noted that FERC’s authority to 
regulate activity related to wholesale rates—which ultimately supported its 
 
 276 Id. at 4. 
 277 Id. at 36–37 (discussing federal–state negotiations in the administrative context and noting that 
“negotiation is common in the settlement of litigation over interstate water allocation in which both parties 
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 278 See supra Section II.A.4. 
 279 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
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demand-response program—is limited to programs that “directly” affect such 
rates.280 States can, and do, force FERC to respect these jurisdictional limits 
through actual and threatened lawsuits.281 
The anticipation of such a lawsuit likely shaped the contours of FERC’s 
demand-response program at the center of the EPSA decision. Jacobs explains 
that the agency was dissatisfied with the small effect that state demand-
response regimes had on retail energy consumption.282 But rather than 
regulating retail markets directly or seeking additional regulatory authority 
from Congress, FERC crafted a wholesale demand-response program that was 
“scrupulously careful not to challenge jurisdictional boundaries directly.”283 
Arguably to avoid a lawsuit or strengthen its position in the event of litigation, 
FERC allowed any state to prohibit its retail customers from participating in 
the program, conceding that “jurisdiction over demand response is a complex 
matter that lies at the confluence of [s]tate and [f]ederal jurisdiction.”284 The 
Court subsequently explained that this opt-out provision “removes any 
conceivable doubt” as to the legality of the program because “[s]tates retain the 
last word” about how the program applies in practice.285  
Importantly, it is in the public interest for states to continue to protect their 
zone of exclusivity provided in the Federal Power Act, even if, as many 
believe, the Act’s provisions are “artificial” and “increasingly irrelevant” to 
modern energy markets.286 Retaining an exclusive sphere of authority gives 
states additional leverage in negotiations.287 Professor Ryan notes that in other 
contexts, “spending power deals” (in which states voluntarily agree to 
surrender jurisdiction in exchange for federal funds) and other forms of 
 
 280 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 774 (2016). 
 281 See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (unsuccessfully challenging Order 888). 
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SMART GRID, http://www.demandresponsesmartgrid.org/page-1334126 (last visited Mar. 9, 2018) [https://web. 
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 284 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 
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“bargained-for encroachment” are common forms of negotiation that adjust the 
federal–state boundary in ways that are mutually beneficial to both parties.288  
2. Exercising Independent Regulatory Authority  
Perhaps most obviously, states can act unilaterally to regulate conduct that 
lies within the zone of concurrent jurisdiction. From a negotiation perspective, 
such a move could serve a variety of purposes. The state may be acting to fill 
what it perceives as a policymaking gap caused by FERC inaction, or to 
remedy a state-specific problem that, although within FERC’s purview, is not 
sufficiently important to warrant a national response. The state may also enact 
such a program to encourage the creation of federal policy, using its 
jurisdiction as a case study to illustrate what the results of a national policy 
might look like in practice.289 As noted above, demand-response programs and 
renewable portfolio standards are both examples of unilateral state action 
designed to either fill a regulatory void or to offer a test case at the state level 
to prompt federal policymakers toward national action.290  
At its most extreme, the state may enact a policy directly adverse to a 
FERC initiative to signal disagreement with federal policy and push 
unilaterally for change. Professor Ryan notes that this model of “intersystemic 
signaling negotiations” explains the ongoing battle between state and federal 
officials over medical marijuana.291 Within the energy policy sphere, the state 
antitrust suit in ONEOK offers one such example. Although FERC had 
authority under section 5 of the Natural Gas Act to regulate the sham 
transactions allegedly committed by defendants, it neither enacted rules to 
prohibit such behavior during the energy crisis nor moved to punish that 
behavior afterward.292 It thus at least implicitly permitted the practice. By 
providing an alternative forum for victims of transactions to sue via the 
antitrust laws, the states at issue expressed disagreement with FERC’s decision 
 
 288 See id. at 38–44 (discussing spending power deals and bargained-for encroachment in the context of 
federalism negotiations). 
 289 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of 
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not to act immediately upon the market manipulation allegations. Only after 
the state antitrust cases were filed did FERC adopt a Code of Conduct that 
expressly prohibited wash trades and other forms of collusion designed to 
manipulate market conditions.293  
3. Participating in FERC Decision Making 
State regulators also have the option of participating directly in FERC 
proceedings, in which several procedural restrictions require the agency to read 
and respond to states’ (and other interested parties’) concerns. As discussed 
above, the Administrative Procedure Act requires FERC to publish a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and allow opportunities for interested parties to file 
comments with the agency before deciding a final rule.294 State regulators 
regularly file comments to inform FERC commissioners of a particular state’s 
views on proposed federal action.295 The agency is generally required to 
address such comments in its final rule and failure to do so risks vacatur of the 
rule upon judicial review.296 In the EPSA case, the D.C. Circuit vacated the 
order permitting demand response in part because the agency failed to consider 
and engage arguments filed by commenters—and reiterated by dissenting 
Commissioner Moeller—that the program would result in unjust and 
unreasonable rates.297  
In addition to benefiting from the procedural protections afforded all 
commenters, states sometimes receive additional access to FERC decision 
makers through statutorily mandated consultations with affected state 
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comments regarding the environmental effects of a particular hydroelectric power plant scheduled for 
relicensing. See Letter from Joseph Murray, Analyst, N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, to Kimberly D. 
Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Feb. 28, 2018), https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/File_list. 
asp?document_id=14646450. Of course, it is somewhat of a myth to suggest that a state speaks with a unified 
voice. Sometimes, for example, FERC can become a battleground for competing intrastate voices, such as 
when the Massachusetts Attorney General’s office filed comments at FERC challenging the state Department 
of Public Utilities’ decision on a pipeline project. See Letter from Rebecca Tepper, Chief, Energy and 
Telecoms. Div., Office of Mass. Attorney Gen., to Kimberly D. Bose, Sec’y, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/energy-utilities/letter-ferc-docket-14-22-000.pdf.  
 296 See, e.g., NorAM Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 148 F.3d 1158, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t most 
emphatically remains the duty of this court to ensure that an agency engage the arguments raised before it.” 
(quoting K N Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 297 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 225 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court 
disagreed, finding the agency’s treatment of the issue to be sufficient. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n 
(EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 782–84 (2016). 
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regulators. As discussed above, FERC’s authority under the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992 to order a utility to wheel power was conditioned upon giving each 
affected state regulatory authority notice and an opportunity to be heard on the 
issue.298 Similarly, before FERC exercised its statutory authority to form 
Regional Transformation Organizations (RTOs), it held eleven conferences in 
nine different cities to hear the views of state regulators and other interested 
stakeholders.299 FERC held these conferences because Congress had 
conditioned FERC’s rulemaking authority on it granting affected state 
regulators notice and opportunity to be heard.300 Various state commissioners 
used these meetings to advocate for an explicit state regulatory presence in the 
governance of any RTO within the state, leading FERC to establish a formal 
state presence in RTO formation and administration.301 
Finally, state officials often collaborate with agency staff on various 
workshops, presentations, and other events within the agency. Sometimes these 
meetings are facilitated by the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners (NARUC), an interest group governed by and reflecting the 
interests of state regulatory commissioners.302 For example, in May 2016, 
NARUC sent a letter to FERC requesting that six named state commissioners 
be included as panelists at a FERC technical conference on transmission 
development practices.303 Four of the six individuals that NARUC suggested 
were invited to speak at the conference.304  
4. Lobbying Congress 
State interest groups also lobby Congress formally and informally on 
various energy-related matters. Congress has ultimate oversight of FERC 
operations, and in the event of a disagreement with the agency, it can call 
FERC commissioners for hearings, cut the agency’s budget, or, in drastic 
 
 298 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2012). 
 299 Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810, 816 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 35 C.F.R. pt. 
35). 
 300 16 U.S.C. § 824a. 
 301 See Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. at 816–17, 937–38. 
 302 About Us, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, https://www.naruc.org/about-naruc/about-
naruc/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2018). 
 303 See Letter from Travis Kavulla, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, to Norman Bay, 
Chairman, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (May 19, 2016), http://pubs.naruc.org/pub/E845A207-94FB-
0C08-8B58-4BC6E69DC471. 
 304 See Competitive Transmission Development Technical Conference Agenda,FED. ENERGY REG. 
COMMISSION 4, 7–8, http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20160627084845-Final%20Agenda.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2018). 
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cases, pass supplemental legislation to override or modify a FERC decision.305 
Unlike FERC, Congress is naturally predisposed to hear state regulators’ 
concerns: each state regulator has several natural allies in the legislature who 
depend on that state’s voters for reelection and support. There are 
approximately sixty interest groups dedicated to representing state and local 
interests in Washington, known collectively as the “intergovernmental 
lobby.”306 NARUC is perhaps the most active on energy issues,307 although it 
is far from the only such group with an interest in the field.308 In addition to 
providing information to individual members of Congress, NARUC and other 
lobbying groups often provide testimony at congressional hearings on energy 
law issues.309 
As a negotiating tactic, lobbying Congress can be an effective way to 
pressure FERC into altering course, even if Congress ultimately takes no 
formal action against the agency. For example, in 2002, FERC proposed a 
series of measures designed to bring uniformity to wholesale markets, known 
collectively as Standard Market Design (SMD).310 The proposal was deeply 
unpopular with many commenters, including states, which criticized the 
proposal for dismissing too quickly the significance of regional variation 
within those markets.311 Opposition was particularly fierce from regulators in 
the Pacific Northwest and the South, regions that had successfully opted out of 
FERC’s earlier efforts to impose regional uniformity on markets through 
voluntary participation in RTOs.312 In addition to filing comments in the SMD 
rulemaking proceeding, NARUC and state officials lobbied Congress to force 
 
 305 See, e.g., Press Release, House Energy & Commerce Comm., Walden Announces Budget Oversight 
Hearings (Feb. 5, 2018), https://energycommerce.house.gov/news/press-release/walden-announces-budget-
oversight-hearings/ (summoning all FERC Commissioners to a March 1, 2018, budget hearing before the 
House Subcommittee on Energy). 
 306 See Note, supra note 248, at 621. 
 307 See, e.g., Letter from John Betkoski, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs, to the 
Chairman and Comm’rs, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2017), https://pubs.naruc.org/pub/ 
35409F29-0A60-FF1C-39C2-9985EDFCF478 (highlighting the need for PURPA reform).  
 308 For example, the National League of Cities works to assure FERC rates are just and reasonable, and 
to shield municipally owned utilities from FERC jurisdiction. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, 2017 NATIONAL 
MUNICIPAL POLICY AND RESOLUTIONS 25 (2016).  
 309 See Policy & Advocacy, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, https://www.naruc.org/policy-
and-advocacy/congressional-advocacy/ (last updated Feb. 22, 2018) (listing recent congressional testimony by 
NARUC members). 
 310 See Lynne Kiesling & Brian Mannix, Standard Market Design in Wholesale Electricity Markets: Can 
FERC’s Proposed Structure Adapt to the Unknown?, ELECTRICITY J., Mar. 2003, at 11, 12.  
 311 See id.  
 312 See Clinton A. Vance et al., What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?, 27 
ENERGY L.J. 65, 75–76 (2006). 
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FERC to withdraw the proposal.313 Congress asked the Department of 
Energy—which oversees FERC—to review the SMD proposal, which 
effectively stayed the proceeding at the agency.314 The following year, FERC 
released a revised proposal that sought to address opponents’ concerns,315 
although the changes did little to stem opposition. As Congress began 
considering the Energy Policy Act of 2005, pressure mounted by lobbyists to 
add a provision in the statute that would have delayed adoption of the SMD 
proposal by several years.316 Although the requested language did not make it 
into the final bill,317 the pressure was sufficient to cause FERC to withdraw the 
SMD proposal in July 2005.318 
5. Participating in Regional Cooperative Structures 
Finally, states can negotiate policy through participation in associations 
designed to foster greater regional cooperation on energy issues. As discussed 
above, most electricity markets are best understood as neither intrastate nor 
national, but instead are regional in scope.319 In federalism scholarship, the 
matching principle generally states that the size of the geographic area affected 
by a specific decision should determine the appropriate level of government to 
regulate to avoid the risks of spillover effects (if a jurisdiction is too small) and 
the loss of relevant local knowledge (if the jurisdiction is too large).320 The 
matching principle suggests that many energy law issues should be considered 
at the regional level.321 
There are two ways states might formally cooperate to construct regional-
level governance structures. The first is through interstate compacts, 
agreements between two or more states that require congressional approval 
 
 313 See Harvey Reiter, The Contrasting Policies of the FCC and FERC Regarding the Importance of 
Open Transmission Networks in Downstream Competitive Markets, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 243, 260 & n.88 
(2005) (discussing efforts by state officials to challenge SMD proposal in agency comments and congressional 
testimony). 
 314 Vance et al., supra note 312, at 75. 
 315 Id. at 75–76. 
 316 Mark S. Hegedus, Points Well-Taken: Comments on Professor Peter Carstensen’s Paper “Creating 
Workably Competitive Wholesale Markets in Energy”, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 145, 147 (2005). 
 317 Id. 
 318 Vance et al., supra note 312, at 75–76. 
 319 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 320 See Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996); see also Lyons, 
supra note 10, at 1648 (applying the matching principle to electricity market decisions). 
 321 See Lyons, supra note 10, at 1648 (“Using the Matching Principle, one quickly realizes the error in 
traditional preemption analysis: for many issues, the relevant geographic area is not national, but regional.”). 
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under the Compact Clause.322 One example is the Western Interstate Energy 
Board (WIEB), an organization approved by the Western Interstate Nuclear 
Compact323 that comprises the eleven western states and three Canadian 
provinces that make up the Western Interconnection.324 WIEB includes a 
Committee on Regional Electric Power Cooperation, which works to improve 
the efficiency of the western power grid.325 Organizations founded on interstate 
compacts such as WIEB are useful bottom-up counterweights to potential 
FERC efforts to provide regional regulation from the top down, and can thus 
help states work together to negotiate a larger voice in regional affairs. 
The other method of regional governance involves establishing FERC-
administered regional structures designed to promote cooperative federalism. 
As Professor Weiser notes, “[T]he cooperative federalism regulatory strategy 
makes sense where the benefits of allowing for diversity in federal regulatory 
programs outweigh the benefits of demanding uniformity in all situations.”326 
It thus works well when the federal government has a broad policy that it 
wishes to pursue but lacks a clear consensus regarding precisely how that 
policy should be achieved. Cooperative federalism regimes thus seek to 
capture many of the benefits of federalism and decentralized policymaking, 
while using a light federal touch to make sure state and local experimentation 
do not disrupt broader national objectives.327  
Cooperative federalism can come in a wide array of structures. This 
category includes highly centralized, federally administered programs with a 
state opt-out such as the demand-response program in EPSA, which the Court 
explicitly called out as a “program of cooperative federalism, in which the 
[s]tates retain the last word.”328 Or it could be far more decentralized, in which 
the federal government sets broad strokes and leaves others to fill in the 
details. Professors Osofsky and Wiseman have discussed in significant detail 
the benefits to federalism that flow from FERC’s creation of regional 
transmission organizations, which are bottom-up nongovernmental 
organizations dedicated to managing transmission grids and often include state 
 
 322 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State.”). 
 323 Act of Oct. 16, 1970, Pub. L. 91-461, art. II, 84 Stat. 979, 979–80.  
 324 What We Do, W. INTERSTATE ENERGY BOARD, http://westernenergyboard.org/wieb-board/who-what/ 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2018). 
 325 Id. 
 326 Weiser, supra note 74, at 1698. 
 327 See id. 
 328 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016).  
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and local policymakers among other relevant stakeholders within their 
governance structures.329  
C. Efforts to Improve Opportunities for Federalism Bargaining 
Re-conceptualizing energy federalism as a negotiation rather than a battle 
also shifts the focus of normative claims for further reforms. Rather than 
fretting about the substantive question of what the proper level of state or 
federal jurisdiction should be, one asks instead what changes can be made to 
improve the overall bargaining process, thus increasing the likelihood of 
reaching mutually agreeable outcomes through joint decision making.330 
Professor Ryan suggests multiple potential avenues to improve federalism 
bargaining, two of which stand out most in the energy law sphere and are thus 
discussed below in turn: (1) creating procedural reforms aimed at fostering 
federalism values and (2) establishing intelligently designed forums for 
federal–state bargaining to occur. 
1. Creating Procedural Reforms to Foster Federalism Values 
Professor Ryan suggests that to improve bargaining over federalism issues, 
“legislators and administrators can foster federalism values through purposeful 
procedural design.”331 The purpose of such reforms is to assure that bargaining 
parties adequately consider the implications their actions will have on 
federalism.332 The key ideas with which federalism is concerned—including 
uniformity versus diversity, spillover effects versus local knowledge, and the 
relative expertise and capacity of institutional actors—are important factors 
that can help guide negotiations to reach the optimal policy outcome. But these 
factors are also esoteric and can potentially get lost amidst the minutiae of 
specific federal–state negotiations. Procedural reforms that bring federalism 
values back to the forefront will therefore increase the likelihood that any 
negotiation will take federalism values into account. 
 
 329 See Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 273 (arguing in favor of the establishment of “hybrid” 
institutions that include both private and public actors and actors from several levels of government to 
coordinate energy regulation). 
 330 Cf. Ryan, supra note 25, at 5 (“[G]overnment actors move forward by substituting procedural 
consensus for substantive clarity about the central federalism inquiry—who gets to decide?—in individual 
regulatory contexts.”). 
 331 Id. at 129. 
 332 Id. at 128–29 (discussing possible changes to the federal–state bargaining structure). 
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Because, as noted above, FERC is most often likely to be the final decision 
maker on energy policy issues,333 procedural reforms should be aimed at 
assuring federalism values are properly considered in the agency’s 
deliberations. One group of reforms is analogous to what Professor Ernest 
Young has termed “resistance norms” in constitutional federalism debates.334 
These are “rules that raise obstacles to particular governmental actions without 
barring those actions entirely.”335 In the energy law context, resistance norms 
would help assure that, before FERC acts on a proposal that would displace 
state authority, it has considered the federalism implications of that action. 
One useful resistance norm would be to ensure FERC compliance with 
Executive Order 13,132. The order instructs agencies that “[n]ational action 
limiting the policymaking discretion of the [s]tates shall be taken only where 
there is constitutional and statutory authority for the action and the national 
activity is appropriate in light of the presence of a problem of national 
significance.”336 Agencies should construe a federal statute to preempt state 
law only when (1) the statute expressly preempts state law, (2) “there is some 
other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of [s]tate law,” or 
(3) “the existence of [s]tate authority conflicts with the exercise of [f]ederal 
authority under the [f]ederal statute.”337 Moreover, agencies proposing to 
preempt state law through adjudication or rulemaking “shall provide all 
affected [s]tate and local officials notice and an opportunity for appropriate 
participation in the proceedings.”338 
Executive Order 13,132 fosters federalism values by assuring that agencies 
explain why intruding on state authority is necessary and by giving state 
officials a forum where they can negotiate with the agency before the agency 
action takes effect. While the order is currently in force, it suffers from two 
defects that limit its usefulness to energy federalism disputes. First, the order 
explicitly does not apply to independent agencies such as FERC.339 Second, it 
lacks an enforcement mechanism, meaning that even those agencies that are 
bound by the order often ignore it or conduct low-quality analyses to satisfy 
 
 333 See supra Section II.C. 
 334 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial 
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000).  
 335 Id. 
 336 Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. § 206(3)(b) (2000).  
 337 Id. § 206(4)(a). 
 338 Id. § 206(4)(e). 
 339 Id. § 206(1)(c); see also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘independent regulatory agency’ 
means . . . the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.”). 
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the order’s minimum requirements.340 An enforceable executive order that 
binds FERC (or an equivalent change to FERC’s organic statute that would 
impose these procedures by law) would help improve the influence of 
federalism values on FERC deliberations. 
2. Establishing Forums for Federal–State Bargaining to Occur 
Professor Ryan also suggests that legislators and administrators “draw 
from the lessons of federalism engineering” by “creating forums for state-
federal bargaining.”341 Through these forums, legislators and administrators 
“should seek opportunities to reduce transaction cost barriers . . . through legal 
structures that could increase information flow . . . and build working 
relationships between bargaining participants.”342 Consciously building forums 
for federal–state dialogue would increase opportunities for bargaining and 
therefore maximize the opportunity to reach optimal policy solutions. 
In the energy sector, this recommendation would encourage greater 
reliance on regional cooperative-federalism structures such as RTOs. As 
Professors Osofsky and Wiseman note, RTOs bring together utilities, state 
regulators, federal officials, and others into a single forum that “cross-cut[s] 
the levels of government” to solve difficult policy questions.343 It is perhaps in 
these forums where the greatest opportunities for mutually beneficial 
negotiations between federal and state policymakers may be found, as such 
structures become the situs of reiterated interactions between players at 
multiple levels of government.344 Additional structures such as these can help 
increase the points of contact between federal and state actors, forcing them to 
cooperate to solve regional policy challenges and providing them with a 
permanent forum within which federalism bargaining can occur. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s recent trilogy of cases embracing concurrent jurisdiction is 
both long overdue and a better reflection of the realities of modern electricity 
markets. Going forward, state and federal policymakers will increasingly 
operate in a shared regulatory space. Concurrent jurisdiction provides a set of 
 
 340 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 782–84 (2004). 
 341 Ryan, supra note 25, at 128. 
 342 Id. 
 343 Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 273, at 53–55. 
 344 See id. at 53 (“RTOs help to create a bridge both vertically between the federal and state governments 
and horizontally among their member states.”).  
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principles with which to navigate this shared space, by setting the proper 
jurisdictional boundaries based on individual assessments of what arrangement 
makes sense as a matter of policy, rather than deferring to rigid statutory rules.  
Because of this reality, energy federalism needs to more closely resemble a 
negotiation between state and federal policymakers. While states suffer some 
disadvantage in this arena because of the benefits that administrative law 
affords federal agencies, they nonetheless retain a wide range of tools with 
which to assert state interests in policy debates. Going forward, reformers 
should look for opportunities to improve the ability of federal and state 
authorities to negotiate the line between their respective jurisdictions. Such 
reforms would allow state regulators to retain a voice in decisionmaking and 
improve the likelihood that policy decisions will be sensitive to federalism 
concerns. 
